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THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2009 - HAVE
REORGANIZATION PROCEEDINGS IN EMERGING
MARKETS GONE BANKRUPT? ISRAEL AS A CASE
STUDY
David Hahn*
I. INTRODUCTION
Much like ripples from a pebble radiating to distant shores, the 2007
meltdown of the U.S. market of subprime loans for home ownership1 and
the subsequent collapse of the real estate market2 eventually transformed
into a nationwide financial crisis in 2008 and contaminated other
economies around the world.3 The intertwined investments of private
investors and institutional investors, such as financial institutions and
public and private funds from all over the world in the U.S. financial
*

Senior Lecturer, Bar-Ilan University School of Law, Israel. J.S.D. NYU School of Law. I
am grateful to Gideon Parchomovsky, Assaf Hamdani, Steve Lubben, Harry Rajak, and
Janis Sarra for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
1. See, e.g., How to Sort Out America’s Mortgage Crisis, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 28,
2008,
available
at
http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_TDSGGQPN (describing
the increasing number of foreclosures in America). For the wide spread of subprime loans
in the U.S. population, see Bob Tedeschi, Subprime Loans’ Wide Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
3, 2008, at RE10 (finding that subprime loans affected low-income and minority households
but also upper-income borrowers).
2. But see Stan Liebowitz, New Evidence on the Foreclosure Crisis: Zero Money
Down, Not Subprime Loans Led to the Mortgage Meltdown, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2009, at
A13 (showing that since Q4 of 2006 51% of foreclosures are on prime loans and that the
foreclosure rate on prime loans has risen by 488% while the foreclosure on subprime loans
has risen by only 200%, and arguing accordingly that the single most important factor in the
mortgage foreclosure crisis is the negative equity that homeowners have in their houses).
3. Wall Street’s doomsday was Monday, September 15, 2008, when Lehman Brothers
announced that it would file for Chapter 11 protection and Bank of America announced that
it would buy the heavily indebted Merrill Lynch. See, e.g., David Ellis, Changes Rock Wall
Street,
CNN,
Sept.
15,
2009,
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/US/09/15/banks.bigchanges/index.html (reporting that the
failures of Lehman and Merrill Lynch will “profoundly alter the American financial
landscape”).
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market transported the crisis on to foreign markets in Europe,4 Asia,5 and
the Middle East.6 The economies that have been hit include both well
developed economies and rapidly emerging markets. Emerging markets
around the world have been transforming gradually from prototypically
concentrated banking markets to more balanced markets, relying more than
before on corporate bonds issuing.7 Thus, the current global economic
crisis is a novel challenge for such markets. Economies hit by the crisis
must address broadly the rights of bondholders as the issuing firms are
facing financial distress.
Israel is a classic example of a rapidly growing emerging market,
which has recently joined as a member the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).8 As such, the manner in which Israel
handled the financial crisis can illustrate how the private sector and the
government in emerging markets can overcome the global crisis through
the utilization of traditional and novel mechanisms. Indeed, unlike the
Biblical tenth plague, the plague of the current global economic crisis has
not passed over Israel.9 The crisis has caught Israel at a crossroads. In the
last decade, Israel’s economy has gradually changed from a concentrated
debt market towards a more balanced market where issues of corporate
bonds have become a practical and friendly alternative to bank lending for

4. See, e.g., Erik Berglöf, One Year Into the Credit Crunch: What Have We Learned?,
European
Bank
for
Reconstruction
&
Development,
Sept.
19,
2008,
http://www.ebrd.com/new/stories/2008/080919.htm (stating that countries with the most ties
to international financial markets like Kazakhstan will be most affected).
5. See, e.g., Asian Markets Tumble after Lehman Collapse, THE TIMES OF INDIA, Sept.
16, 2008, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-3488073,prtpage-1.cms
(noting that markets in Hong Kong and Tokyo experienced the largest one-day loss since
9/11).
6. See, e.g., Prince El Hassan bin Talal, The Global Financial Crisis and the Middle
ALJAZEERA
MAGAZINE,
Oct.
24,
2008,
East,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/articles/39/The_global_financial_crisis_and_the_Middle_E
ast.html (finding that even areas in the Middle East not integrated into the global capital
markets will be affected by the global financial crisis).
7. For a comprehensive account of the differences between concentrated and diffuse
debt markets, see John Armour et al., Corporate Ownership Structure and the Evolution of
Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1699 (2002).
8. See OECD, Accession: Estonia, Israel and Slovenia invited to join OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/document/57/0,3343,en_2649_201185_45159737_1_1_1_1,00.html
(May 10, 2010). For a statistical summary of Israel’s economy, see OECD, Country
Statistical
Profiles
2009:
Israel,
http://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?queryname=18187&querytype=view&lang=en
(last
visited Mar. 1, 2010).
9. See Exodus 12:12-13 (New International Version) (“On that same night I will pass
through Egypt and strike down every firstborn—both men and animals—and I will bring
judgment on all the gods of Egypt. I am the LORD. The blood will be a sign for you on the
houses where you are; and when I see the blood, I will pass over you. No destructive plague
will touch you when I strike Egypt.”).
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raising corporate debt.10
Diffuse bond holdings by the public as well as bulk holdings by
institutional investors introduced new players to the traditional arena of
corporate creditors and changed its landscape. The prototypical group of
creditors of a corporation in a concentrated debt environment is
traditionally comprised of banks, commercial suppliers and service
providers, tax authorities, and employees.11 The change in Israel’s credit
market added an important new actor to the mix—the bondholders.
Most series of bonds that have been issued by Israeli firms are
unsecured. Many investors invested in bonds with little regard to the legal
rights attached to the bonds and the investment risks associated therewith.
Protecting the bondholders’ rights upon a financial distress of the
borrowing firm is unfamiliar territory for the Israeli investors.12 Thus, in
the recent crisis, the institutional investors and other bondholders were
debating among themselves and with the issuing firms (i.e., the borrowers)
what could be done in order to minimize their losses and save their
investments in the distressed firms.
The fear of massive defaults on commercial bonds has drawn the full
attention of the government as well. Given that institutional investors, who
aggregate the public’s long term savings, have heavily invested in the
bonds market, the government became concerned about the public’s
money. In responding to this concern, the government explored and
publicly discussed various alternatives for its active intervention in the
bonds crisis. As will be elaborated in this paper, these plans included
government guarantees, insurance, the founding of credit funds, and
more.13
This paper highlights an available mechanism that has been sparsely
used in the current crisis — formal reorganization proceedings under
bankruptcy law. Reorganization proceedings are by no means the
exclusive or necessarily the optimal mechanism for handling a financial
10. On the importance of corporate bonds as a financing alternative to bank lending, see
Meir Sokoler, Senior Director In Charge of Monetary Affairs, Bank of Israel, The
Importance of a Well Developed Bonds Market: An Israeli Perspective, Jan. 28, 2002,
http://www.bankisrael.gov.il/deptdata/neumim/neum085e.htm.
11. This is particularly typical in the financing of SMEs, even in developed economies.
Berger and Udell find that in the U.S. approximately 70% of the financing of small
businesses comes from the principal equity holder, financial institutions (primarily
commercial banks) and trade creditors. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, The
Economics of Small Business Finance: The Roles of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the
Financial Growth Cycle, 22 J. BANK. & FIN. 613 (1998).
12. For the relative disadvantages of dispersed creditors in reacting to a management’s
initiative for a restructuring plan, see Arturo Bris & Ivo Welch, The Optimal Concentration
of Creditors, 60 J. FIN. 2193 (2005).
13. See Part III.B infra (discussing financial initiatives proposed by several
governmental agencies in an effort to assist in dealing with the recent crisis).
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crisis.14 These proceedings are, nonetheless, a useful mechanism. This
paper compares the relative advantages of formal reorganization
proceedings and governmental intervention and outlines the underlying
obstacles that currently impede the use of bankruptcy even when it is an
adequate channel for handling the bonds crisis.
Moreover, this paper criticizes the current legal state of the domestic
reorganization law and calls for certain revisions that would likely facilitate
the use of formal reorganization as a viable and efficient mechanism for
handling bondholders’ rights upon the financial distress of a firm.
Additionally, this paper argues that alongside any legal reform, the
erroneous cultural perception of reorganization proceedings as an event
indicating failure and as instigating a problem for the creditors must give
way to a more balanced and businesswise understanding that such
proceedings merely reflect a preexisting economic problem and that these
proceedings may actually produce an opportunity for rescue where
"conventional" treatments fail.
This paper is organized as follows. Part II outlines the effects of the
global crisis on the domestic Israeli market. It will show particularly how
the bonds market has declined as a result of the crisis, cutting the value of
long term savings of the general public and turning the crisis into a national
concern. Part III then describes the various proposed and advanced
initiatives to tackle the bonds crisis, both by the private sector and by the
government. In the private sector, the controlling shareholders of the
issuing firms began negotiating haircuts of the bonds and repurchasing the
bonds at a discount on the secondary market. On its end, the government
proposed several financing channels to support the market and drafted a bill
that would facilitate out-of-court workouts.
Part IV of the article turns the focus to bankruptcy law. It shows
empirically that the parties hardly use bankruptcy proceedings for resolving
the firms’ financial distress. It then analyzes the reasons for this seldom
use of bankruptcy, which includes legal impediments and psychologicalcultural barriers. In Part V, the paper discusses the relative advantages of a
governmental intervention in favor of the private sector on one hand and
the advantages of a case-by-case bankruptcy resolution for financial
distress. This discussion concludes that no approach clearly outweighs the
alternative.
Given the importance of the alternative of formal bankruptcy, Part VI
then calls for a change in the cultural attitude and the adoption of formal
14. See Edward R. Morrison, Bargaining Around Bankruptcy: Small Business
Workouts and State Law (Colum. L. & Econ, Working Paper No. 320), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1065543 (showing that the vast
majority of small businesses in the U.S. use non-bankruptcy procedures to reorganize or
liquidate).
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reorganization as a legitimate and useful means for resolving a firm’s
financial distress. To encourage this change of heart in the business sector,
I propose several legal revisions including a partial adoption of a debtor-inpossession (DIP) controlled reorganization regime, the carving of floating
charges in favor of unsecured creditors, facilitating the continuance of
executory contracts and the enactment of a cramdown provision for
confirming a reorganization plan.
Part VII offers possible implications of the Israeli case study for the
U.S. markets. Joining the commentators who have advocated the use of
formal bankruptcy in lieu of a general government bailout, the precedent of
Israel’s corporate bonds crisis shows that government non-intervention
indeed drives the private sector to negotiate independent resolutions and
bear the costs of its poor investment decisions. Given the superiority of
U.S. bankruptcy law and its hospitable atmosphere, such negotiations are
expected to prove even more successful in the U.S. This paper concludes
with a call for using the crisis as a catalyst for reforming Israel’s
reorganization law and transforming it into an attractive option for saving
viable businesses.
II. THE GLOBAL CRISIS AND THE DOMESTIC MARKET

A. Israel’s Changing Capital Market
Israel’s three largest banks, Bank Leumi, Bank Hapoalim and Bank
Discount, have suffered a significant loss in 2008 as a result of their
investments in structured investment vehicles in the U.S.15 Fortunately,
and thanks to early intervention and action by the Bank of Israel,16 these
losses were far from threatening the overall financial stability of these
banks.17 Nonetheless, the operating loss has trimmed the banks’ net worth
15. See, e.g., Sharon Shpurer, U.S. Subprime Mortgage Crisis Hits Discount and Leumi
Too, HAARETZ, July 14, 2008, http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasen/spages/1001364.html (noting
that Discount was down 33% and Leumi down 17% from the start of the year); Sharon
Shpurer & Rotem Starkman, Relief and Red Ink at Bank Hapoalim, HAARETZ, May 23,
2008, http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasen/spages/985892.html (discussing how Bank Hapoalim
finally sold its portfolio of mortgage-based securities after losing about $1.3 billion on its
adventures in the U.S. market for loans to homebuyers of dubious creditworthiness); Ram
Dagan, What Bank Hapoalim Forgot to Mention, HAARETZ, Dec. 12, 2007,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/933208.html (revealing that Bank Hapoalim did not
mention that it had $1.6 billion directly exposed to international credit markets).
16. Press Release, Bank of Israel Office of the Spokesperson and Economic
Information, The Effect of Global Processes on Israel’s Banking System (Dec. 12, 2007),
available at http://www.bankisrael.gov.il/press/eng/071209/071209e.htm.
17. Letter from Mr. Rony Hizkiyahu, Supervisor of Banks, The Research Unit, Bank of
Israel (2008), available at http://www.bankisrael.gov.il/deptdata/pikuah/skira07/ch-t_e.pdf
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to a level that, until recently, made it extremely difficult for them to comply
with the central bank’s requirement that they meet the capital adequacy
standards of Basel II by the end of 2009.18 As a result, by the end of 2008,
the availability of credit to the business sector had shrunk significantly.19
Since the rise of Israel’s high-tech corporations, the global activity and
investments of large Israeli conglomerates and financial institutions, and
the country’s general subsequent economic growth, the operation costs of
the fast growing Israeli businesses increased consistently. As a result, new
channels of financing, such as venture capital, were utilized alongside the
banking system.20 One of the most significant developments in Israel’s
capital market in the past decade was the shift to raising capital through the
issuing of corporate bonds. While the capital market has been active for
many years, the main vehicle for raising capital was traditionally corporate
stock. Until the new millennium, corporate bonds offerings were relatively
negligible.21 In recent years, however, corporations have discovered the
promise of raising capital through the issuing of bonds. Bonds issuing
quickly became the main channel of raising capital in the market in the
current decade, surpassing the amount of capital raised through stock
offerings. The year 2007 marked the peak in bonds issuing, as over $20
billion U.S. dollars ($20,000,000,000) were raised, before the eventual
sharp decline of 2008-2009.22 As of March 2009, there were 638 listed
(“The shocks experienced by the global and domestic financial markets in late 2007 did not
overlook Israel’s banking system, mainly due to the banks’ holdings of asset-backed
securities. Nevertheless, their effect was relatively subdued and did not undermine system
stability. The events did, however, suggest that the foreseen global economic slowdown is
likely to affect Israel, too.”).
18. As of late, Bank Hapoalim was successful in raising fresh capital, and even enjoyed
oversubscription. As a result thereof the bank has met the requisite adequacy of capital
standard. Adi Ben-Israel & Erez Wohlberg, Bank Ha-Poalim Raised 1.7 Billion Shekels,
June 30, 2009, http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000476143&fid=585
(Hebrew).
19. Ms. Rakefet Rosek-Aminah, Head of the Business Division of Bank Leumi, stated
however that the credit crunch is specifically in non-bank credit (i.e. the decline of the
bonds market), while the banks are stable, adequately capitalized and offering credit to their
business customers at the same level as in the past. Globes Capital Market Summit, May
13, 2009, http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000449533&fid=2 (Hebrew).
20. In the second quarter of 2009, Israeli venture capital funds accounted for 40% of the
total amounts invested in the Israeli high-tech industry. AltAssets, Israel High-Tech
Companies Raised $279m in Venture Capital in Q2 2009, July 17, 2009,
http://www.altassets.com/private-equity-news/by-region/middle-eastisrael/israel/article/nz16289.html.
21. In contrast to the private sector, the government made use of the capital market to
offer government bonds for financing many years earlier. Asher A. Blass & Oved Yosha,
Reform in the Israeli Financial System and the Flow of Funds of Publicly Traded
Manufacturing Firms, in THE ISRAELI ECONOMY, 1985-1998: FROM GOVERNMENT
INTERVENTION TO MARKET ECONOMICS 189, 191 tbl.6.1 (Avi Ben-Bassat ed. 2002).
22. Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange, Corporate Fact Sheet (February 2010),
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corporations in the Tel-Aviv Stock Market, 546 issued and outstanding
series of bonds, and the overall market capitalization was comprised of
$140 billion U.S. dollars worth of equity instruments and $160 billion U.S.
dollars worth of bonds.23
The widespread public debt offerings of the new millennium slowly
changed the landscape of the domestic financial market in several aspects.
First, with respect to its public corporations, Israel is gradually shifting
from a typical concentrated banking market to a more balanced market,
where the holding of corporate debt is split between the banks and
bondholders.24 Secondly, a large portion of the corporate bonds issued has
been purchased by institutional investors, such as pension funds, mutual
funds, and insurance companies.25 As a result, negotiations between an
ailing firm and its creditors now involve these investors alongside the
banks. The number of key players in any arrangement that the firm may
wish to orchestrate has risen and reaching a consensual compromise has
become more complicated.26 Third, the magnitude of debt and the debt to
equity ratio that firms undertake are significantly higher than in the past.
Since firms have been able to sidestep the banks and offer unsecured debt
to the public, the relatively rigid banking limitations on a firm’s borrowing

http://www.tase.co.il/TASEEng/AboutTASE/Overview/CorporateFactSheet (last visited
March 9, 2010).
23. Id.
24. The market share of Israel’s commercial banks in the overall outstanding credit to
the private sector (consumers and businesses combined) has dropped from 79.7% in 2003 to
67.12% in 2008. More specifically, the banks’ share in the outstanding credit to commercial
businesses has dropped from 71.91% in 2003 to 55.28% in 2008. Bank of Israel,
Outstanding
Credit
in
the
Economy,
http://www.bankisrael.gov.il/deptdata/stability/indic/t03h.xls (last visited May 12, 2009)
(Hebrew).
25. As of the end of 2008, the general public held 50.9% of all outstanding corporate
bonds, the foreign investors held 0.3%, and institutional investors held 48.8%. The
institutional investors’ holdings were as follows: mutual funds—21.9% (of the overall
bonds); insurance companies—10.7%; pension funds—7.5%; trust funds—6.1%; and
banks—2.5%. Bank of Israel, The Division of Holdings of Traded Non-Governmental
Bonds 2005-2009, http://www.bankisrael.gov.il/deptdata/monetar/assets/tnc12_h.xls (last
visited May 12, 2009) (Hebrew). Corporate bonds comprise approximately 32% of the
institutional investors’ overall portfolio, with bonds rated AA- or higher accounting for
78.3% of the overall bonds held by these investors. MINISTRY OF FINANCE, CAPITAL
MARKETS, INSURANCE AND SAVINGS DIVISION, INCREASING THE INVOLVEMENT OF
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN DEBT ARRANGEMENTS AND TAKING ACTIONS OF COLLECTION
(Feb.
2009),
http://www.finance.gov.il/hon/2001/general/memos/mosdyim2009.pps#3
(Hebrew).
26. Urlich Hege, Workouts, Court-Supervised Reorganization and the Choice between
Private and Public Debt, 9 J. CORP. FIN. 233 (2003). Cf. Elazar Berkovitch & Ronen Israel,
Optimal Bankruptcy Laws Across Financial Systems, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 347 (1999); Enrica
Detragiache, Public Versus Private Borrowing: A Theory with Implications for Bankruptcy
Reform, 3 J. FIN. INTERMED. 327 (1994).
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potential have been relaxed and overridden.27 Finally, due to the
development of bonds issues, much of the corporate debt is not held
throughout the term of the loan by the original investor but is being traded
on the secondary market. This facilitates liquidity for the original
investors-lenders and allows them to pass on the credit risks to speculative
investors. It also facilitates a relatively simple exit for original lenders,
who wish to fix their losses at a certain level and avoid any potential
additional decline of their investments outside or inside formal insolvency
proceedings.

B. Importation of the Global Crisis

1. Real Estate Corporations
The most significant direct effect of the global crisis on the Israeli
market was the operation and investment losses suffered by the country’s
largest public conglomerates that manage large commercial real estate
development projects around the globe. Israeli corporations act today
across the globe, including leading economies as India and China in Asia,
Eastern and Central Europe, and North America. A classic example of this
foreign real estate activity is the 2007 launching of the Las Vegas Plaza
Hotel grand project, undertaken as a joint venture by IDB and Delek, two
of the largest non-bank conglomerates in Israel.28 In conjunction with
broadening the scope of their real activity, these corporations have also
diversified their financing sources. In addition to traditional financing by
Israeli banks, part of the investments in foreign real estate was financed by
foreign banks. Domestic banks in the target countries enjoy superiority in
enforcing financial obligations, especially through foreclosure on the real
estate to the extent it has been collateralized by the borrower corporation.
Indeed, many bank loans, the purpose of which was the financing of such
projects, were secured by the developing real estate on a non-recourse
basis.29
The loss of value in foreign real estate investments contaminated

27. Shane A. Johnson, The Effect of Bank Debt on Optimal Capital Structure, 26 FIN.
MAN. 47 (1997).
28. See Plaza Owners Elad Plan $8 Billion Las Vegas Casino, REUTERS, Nov. 13,
2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1358343220071113 (describing plans to build a
hotel, residences, shops, restaurants and a casino, originally expected to be completed in
2011).
29. Non-recourse financing is common for real estate development projects. JEFFREY
DELMON, PROJECT FINANCE, BOT PROJECTS AND RISK, 79-95 (Aspen Publishers 2005).
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domestic investments in the Israeli capital market as well.30 The real estate
crisis in North America and Europe adversely affected the economic value
of Israeli corporate bonds. Once the value of real estate in those economic
markets depreciated and was marked down in the firms’ financial
statements, it no longer covered the non-recourse bank loans. The banks
became undersecured and, consequently, no surplus remained for satisfying
the unsecured claims of the bondholders. The firms’ credit ratings declined
and raising new capital to service current debt payments became overly
expensive. Also, the general downturn in the foreign economies slowed
down the sales and leases of completed projects and thus further
constrained the Israeli firms’ cash-flow. Thus, periodical interest payments
on domestic bonds were exposed to a substantial risk of default.31 As a
result, in 2008 the Tel-Bonds 20 and the Tel-Bonds 40 indices dropped 3%
and 22%, respectively.32
In May 2009, the Israel Securities Authority (ISA) reviewed the
payments listed corporations owed to their creditors for the first half of
2009. Of 258 corporations with due payments during the surveyed period,
the ISA took a sample of 141 of the 258 corporations with payments due
during the surveyed period.33 Of these 141 corporations, 114 corporations
owed primarily non-bank debt (that is, bonds debt).34 The total debt
payments due by the sampled corporations by the end of June 2009 totaled
$3 billion dollars,35 of which real estate corporations owed $1.25 billion
dollars (approximately 42% of the total sampled debt).36 The ISA
estimated that about 0.3 billion dollars, or 11% of the total debt of the
sampled corporations, would not be paid by the end of June 2009 due to the
issuing firms’ insolvency.37
The year 2009 may be just the first in a series of years where Israel’s

30. As of the end of 2008, there were 141 real estate, construction and agricultural
corporations listed on the TASE. Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, The Development of the
Number
of
Listed
Corporations,
2009,
available
at
http://www.tase.co.il/NR/rdonlyres/BA0FA418-0993-4BB6-B67475C961A04F9E/0/Stat_l06_2009.pdf (last visited May 20, 2009) (Hebrew).
31. The Israel Securities Authority (ISA) demanded as of late 2007 that all firms
investing in and operating real estate projects in Europe and the USA must disclose in a
special report the possible effect of the subprime crisis on their operations.
32. Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, 2008 Annual Report (Dec. 2008), available at
http://www.tase.co.il/NR/rdonlyres/C701C5B1-6876-48FA-8E5A6F69DF77B96F/0/Research_2008_12_140291.pdf (last visited July 20, 2009) (Hebrew).
33. ISA, Economic Department, The 2007/2009 Credit Crisis, A Study for Assessing the
Corporations’ Ability to Meet their Obligations in the First Half of 2009 2 (2009), available
at http://www.isa.gov.il/Download/IsaFile_3962.pdf (Hebrew).
34. Id. at 8.
35. Id. at 2.
36. Id. at 3.
37. Id. at 5.
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capital market will face the challenge of financially distressed corporations
satisfying their bonds payments. The aggregate payment of issued and
outstanding bonds traded on the TASE due between 2010 and 2013 is
$22.5 billion dollars.38 Of this amount, approximately $5 billion dollars, or
22.2%, is due on bonds that, as of the end of April 2009, were traded on the
market at a discount of 25% or more off of their par value.39 This calls into
question the solvency of the issuing corporations. Although the bonds
market recovered to some extent in July and August 2009, one should not
overlook the severity of the crisis and its potential adverse effect on the
entire non-bank credit market.40 Indeed, the announcement by AfricaIsrael, a real estate giant conglomerate, that it will not be able to meet its
future bonds payments, may be just the first sign of a dim future.41
2. Shrinkage of Export
Real estate firms are by no means the sole business entities exposed to
the global crisis. In the global investment atmosphere, some of Israel’s
largest banks invested significant amounts in U.S. SIVs and suffered severe
losses during the second half of 2008, when Wall Street and the rest of the
U.S. financial system collapsed.42 Moreover, even commercial and
industrial firms who do not maintain operations and investments abroad
suffered from the global crisis. Given the slowdown of the European and
American economies and the decrease in demand for products and services,
commercial exports from Israeli firms to these major markets
correspondingly shrunk.43 The decline in sales has strangled the cash-flow
38. ISA, Economic Department, The 2007/2009 Credit Crisis, The Corporate Bonds
Market
–
Expected
Payments
3
(2009),
available
at
http://www.isa.gov.il/Download/IsaFile_3961.pdf. (Hebrew).
39. Id. For payments due in any given quarter between 2009 and 2011, real estate
corporations account for anywhere between 50%-70% of the bonds that have been traded at
a discount of 25% or more off of their par value. Id. at 4.
40. See GLOBES RESEARCHES & PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, Debt & Order—From
Crisis to Arrangement? The Corporate Bonds Market--The Next Generation, 31 (July
2009), available at http://smile.globes.co.il/research/cbonds.pdf. (Hebrew) (stating that it is
doubtful whether the non-bank credit market could be rehabilitated without first treating the
distressed debts and developing mechanisms that will decrease the risk of a future
recurrence of the crisis in the bonds market).
41. See AFI, Financial Statements, Quarterly Statement for the Period Ending on June
30, 2009, note 1B, available at http://maya.tase.co.il/bursa/report.asp?report_cd=469018.
(Hebrew) (publicly announcing its financial distress and need for a creditors’ arrangement).
42. See supra text accompanying note 15 (discussing how Israel’s three largest banks,
Bank Leumi, Bank Hapoalim and Bank Discount, suffered a significant loss in 2008 as a
result of their investments in the U.S.).
43. Bank of Israel, Research Department, The Economic Developments between MayAugust
2008,
3
available
at
http://www.bankisrael.gov.il/develheb/develheb122/develheb.pdf. (Hebrew) (stating that the

HAHNFINAL

2010]

6/10/2010 10:52:42 AM

REORGANIZATION PROCEEDINGS IN EMERGING MARKETS

741

of these firms and impeded their ability to fulfill their debt obligations.
C. Transformation into a Macro Crisis
The wide scope of the bonds crisis transformed a seemingly isolated
and micro crisis of certain distressed firms into a macro crisis that
threatened the stability and integrity of the entire capital market. Too much
money of too many investors was at stake. Institutional investors became a
viable alternative to bank lending only in recent years. Should these
investors suffer too large a loss in the crisis, it may effectively drive them
out of the credit market and cause them to restructure their portfolios and
concentrate on the stock market. As a result, the main achievements of the
reform spearheaded by the Bachar Banking Reform Committee, including
altering the supply of credit to businesses, creating a competitive credit
environment and curtailing the banks’ absolute control of this market,
would be negated.44 Thus, maintaining the ex-bank credit market requires
the enactment of safety measures to protect the institutional investors’
investments.
Moreover, the institutional investors invest in the capital market with
money raised from and managed on behalf of laymen who manage their
long term savings through those institutions. Pension funds, mutual funds
and insurance companies manage hundreds of billions of Israeli Shekels
belonging to employees and individual entrepreneurs who save for their
retirement.45 The government approved investment of these savings in the
capital market in order to enhance the returns on these savings, on one
hand, and inject fresh financing to the growing and demanding capital
market, on the other.46 The great losses that the institutional investors were
likely to suffer as a result of the corporate bonds crisis were the general
population’s lifelong savings. The belief was that the government would
not allow such dramatic outcomes, which affect the foundations of the
labor and capital basis of the country’s economy, to unravel. The
government, through the Ministry of Finance, indeed was not indifferent to
the macro ramifications of the bonds’ crisis. It searched for certain
protective and stimulus measures to address the crisis and its negative
impact. The exact form of intervention would be determined by the newly
continuation of economic crisis in the U.S. and its spillover into Europe increase the risk
that the crisis will affect Israel as well).
44. For an outline of the Bachar Committee and its subsequent transpiring, see Bachar
Reform, available at http://www.finance.gov.il/bachar/pdf/bachar_English.pdf.
45. The value of the total assets managed by the mutual funds alone, as of the end of
2008, was approximately $54 billion dollars. MOF, Capital Markets, Insurance and Savings
Division,
Mutual
Funds—2008
Annual
Summary,
available
at
http://147.237.72.127/kupot_gemel/kg_sikum_main.htm (Hebrew).
46. Bachar Committee, supra note 44.
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elected government following the general elections of February 2009.
Nonetheless, even in the months preceding the induction of the new
government, the public expected an imminent governmental response.
Meanwhile, all parties involved became fixed in their positions and any
initiatives to settle the crisis of any particular firm separately were delayed
as long as the firm had not actually defaulted on a payment.
The names of the firms that suffered from cash distress, their size
relative to Israel’s economy, and the identity of their controlling
shareholders is yet another factor that painted this crisis in a dramatic
fashion. Among the firms whose bonds were traded in the second half of
2008 at significant discounts are some of the country’s largest
conglomerates,47 including ten corporations whose bonds are included in
the blue chip Tel-Bond 20 index.48 These giants are considered the
backbone of Israel’s economy and its bridges to the global market.
Furthermore, the controlling shareholders of these conglomerates are the
most powerful and influential persons in Israel, who enjoy close
relationships with the politicians and regulators. Whether justified or not,
their personal precarious positions in this crisis quickly became an
independent public concern. Using their access to the government and the
media, these tycoons publicly portrayed the financial crisis of their business
groups as a larger general crisis of Israel’s economy as a whole.49 Turning
their personal business crises into a national one helped their cause and
allowed them to lobby for a wide-range, government brokered solution that
would save the corporations, and would also preserve their control and
holdings in those business groups.

47. For a discussion of the financial distress of the real estate giant Africa-Israel, see
Yuval Maoz, Africa-Israel Bonds Dropped 20%; Delek Real Estate Dropped 11.1% to a
Oct.
3,
2008,
Discount
of
38%,
HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArtPE.jhtml?itemNo=1026053&contrassID=2&su
bContrassID=17&sbSubContrassID=0 (Hebrew); Michael Rochvarger, Can Leviev Repay
Oct.
30,
2008,
NIS
23
Billion?,
HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1032847.html.
48. The most notable drops of market value of bonds in 2008 were those of AfricaIsrael (70%), Gazit Globe (30%) and Amot (15%)—all real estate centered businesses.
Other notable conglomerates whose bonds plunged were of IDB Development and Discount
Investments (10%). See TASE, supra note 32 (presenting drops in market value of bonds
for the year 2008).
49. See, e.g., Elazar Levine, Akirov: Without a Bonds Arrangement Things will Turn
Bad, NEWS1, Apr. 1, 2009, http://www.news1.co.il/Archive/001-D-195944-00.html?tag=1827-55 (last visited July 20, 2009) (Hebrew) (citing the tycoon Alfred Akirov as stating that
without a general bonds payment arrangement the economic situation will turn bad for all).
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III. RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS

A. The Private Sector

1. Negotiating for Haircuts
The imminent risk of default, coupled with the shortage of cash in the
financial sector limits the firms’ options. Successful negotiated settlements
that would eventually result in refinancing of the corporate bonds depend
on the ability of the firms to unify their bondholders and persuade them that
this is their best option to eventually collect their claims. Haircuts of
bonds, that is, relieving the corporate issuer from paying back a certain
percentage of the bonds’ par value, is an idea that was thrown into the
public discourse, but was received critically by the investors.50 The general
understanding was that such mitigations of the corporate debt are unfair
and run afoul of the fundamental principles of loan agreements and
corporate governance.51 To turn down part of the creditors’ claims without
requiring the abdication of the shareholders is at odds with the principles of
risk and return in investments.
2. Repurchase of Bonds
Another practice adopted to combat the bonds’ free fall in the
market and the imminent risk of default that controlling shareholders have
used since the onset of the current crisis is the repurchase of bonds in the
market at their updated, discounted, market price.52 Bondholders who

50. See, e.g., Michael Rochvarger & Etti Aflalo, Steinmetz Tries to Give his BSG
Dec.
15,
2008,
Bondholders
a
Steep
Haircut,
HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1046523.html (describing Steinmetz’ attempt to
provide BSG investors with a lower return than their original investment).
51. See, e.g., Etti Aflalo, Ocif Backs Down from Giving Bondholders a Haircut,
HAARETZ, Jan. 7, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=1053443
(describing how one company backed down from giving bondholders a haircut and instead
agreed to a “trim” and paying the investors a higher sum).
52. The repurchases were through the open market. Another potential alternative for
debt repurchase is via a tender offer. See Timothy Kruse, Tom Nohel & Steven K. Todd,
The
Decision
to
Repurchase
Debt
(Mar.
2009),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1364846 (compiling a sample of debt
tender offers executed between 1989 and 1996). For adverse effects of such initiatives on
bondholders’ rights, see John C. Coffee, Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The
Problem of Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1207 (1991); Victor Brudney, Corporate Bondholders and Debtor Opportunism: In
Bad Times and Good, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1821 (1992).
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wished to cut their losses and avoid further declines in their portfolios
disposed of their bonds and were glad to meet purchasers in the market,
regardless of their identity. According to the ISA’s data, in the six months
between December 2008 and May 2009, 1,715 repurchase transactions took
place, relating to 239 series of bonds that were issued by 161
corporations.53 The repurchases generated to the selling bondholders an
aggregate amount of $0.475 billion dollars, on bonds the par value of
which was $0.975 billion dollars, representing an average discount of
52%.54 Approximately 57% of the repurchases were completed by the
controlling shareholder, usually a parent corporation, or a subsidiary of the
issuing corporation; 43% of the repurchases were completed by the issuing
corporation itself.55 Since real estate corporations are the ones who
suffered the most from the bonds crisis,56 it is no surprise that
approximately 56% of the aggregate repurchases of bonds in the market
were in connection with this industry.57
B. Governmental Financial Initiatives
Several governmental agencies proposed various channels of
assistance to deal with the current crisis. Five channels are worth
mentioning: (a) the establishment and enlargement of governmentsupported funds for advancing credit to SMEs; (b) a government guarantee
for raising additional capital by the banks; (c) a government insurance of
new issues of corporate bonds; (d) the establishment of lever funds; and (e)
government financing of prepackaged reorganization plans. Channels (a),
(b), and (d) were adopted and actually launched, while channels (c) and (e)
were not carried forward. Each of the channels is described summarily
below.

1. Credit Funds for SMEs
Prior to the current crisis, the government, through the Ministry of
53. ISA, Economic Department, The 2007/2009 Credit Crisis, The Corporate Bonds
Market—Self
Repurchases
2
(2009),
available
at
http://www.isa.gov.il/Download/IsaFile_3964.pdf (Hebrew).
54. Id. In the year 2008, the volume of repurchases was even greater and totaled $0.775
billion dollars. TASE, Research Department, Repurchases of Corporate Bonds in 2008
(2009), available at http://www.tase.co.il/NR/rdonlyres/6B1292EA-1CCD-4D4F-80E4117093ED9E58/0/Research_2009_04_143659.pdf (Hebrew).
55. ISA, supra note 53, at 4; TASE, supra note 54, Graph 1.
56. See supra Part II.B.1. (discussing the effect of the global crisis on Israeli real estate
corporations that manage large commercial real estate development projects).
57. ISA, supra note 53, at 5; TASE, supra note 54, Graph 2.
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Finance (MOF), in a joint venture with three medium sized banks,
maintained a fund for advancing credit to small businesses, who
experienced difficulties in obtaining credit from the banks. One-sixth of
the fund is financed by the MOF and five-sixths by the participating banks.
The fund advances credit to eligible small businesses and the government
provides collateral for 70% of the amount of each specific loan.58 This
allows small businesses to obtain financing at reasonable rates while
limiting the collateral they would be required to provide to a maximum of
30% of the loan. During the current crisis, the MOF offered to enlarge the
fund by injecting an additional $10 million dollars on its part and an
additional $50 million dollars from the banks.59 Eventually this fund
received a fresh infusion of $110 million dollars from its participants.
In addition, in January 2009, the MOF established a new fund for
advancing loans to eligible medium sized businesses,60 as a joint venture
with participating banks. The fund raised $325 million dollars, 20% of
which came from the MOF; participating banks contributed the remaining
80%.61 Any eligible business may obtain a loan from this fund that shall
not exceed 8% of the business’ annual turnover. Other terms of the fund
include: 1) the annual interest rate shall not exceed the prime rate +2.9%;
2) the maximum term of the loan is five years; and 3) the government
provides collateral for 70% of the amount of each specific loan.62
Recently, the MOF has expressed some dissatisfaction with the low
extent of bank lending to the business sector. As a result, the MOF began
exploring the possibility of establishing a joint venture with institutional
investors’ joint funds that will raise $250 million dollars in order to provide
non-bank credit to private corporations. The primary beneficiaries of these
funds would be corporations whose primary assets are intellectual property

58. Eligible businesses for this fund are businesses whose annual turnover does not
exceed $5.5 million dollars.
59. Press Release, Ministry of Finance, The Acceleration Plan is Under Way—The
MOF Contacted the Banks for Enlarging the Loans for Small Businesses Fund by 240
Million
Shekels
(Dec.
10,
2008),
available
at
http://www.mof.gov.il/Lists/List19/Attachments/10/2008-2628.doc. (Hebrew).
60. Eligible businesses for this fund are those with annual turnover rates between $5.5
million dollars and $25 million dollars.
61. Press Release, Ministry of Finance, Within the Framework of the Acceleration
Plan—The Loans for Medium Sized Businesses Governmental Fund in the Amount of 1.3
Billion
Shekels
has
been
Launched
(Jan.
9,
2009),
available
at
http://www.mof.gov.il/Lists/List19/Attachments/14/2009-12.doc. (Hebrew).
62. Press Release, Ministry of Finance, The MOF Continues to Implement the
Acceleration Plan—Contacted Today the Banks for the Establishment of the Loans for
Medium Sized Businesses Fund that is Projected to Reach the Amount of Approximately 1
Billion
Shekels
(Dec.
14,
2008),
available
at
http://www.mof.gov.il/Lists/List19/Attachments/11/2008-2638.doc (Hebrew).
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and corporations in the agricultural industry.63
2. Guaranteeing the Banks’ Raising of Capital
In a somewhat similar manner to other countries, the Israeli
government wished to stabilize the banking industry, given its large role in
the credit market and out of concern for the public’s deposits. For that
purpose, the government provided a $1.5 billion dollars guarantee for
raising fresh subordinated debt by the banks.64 This money is expected to
further stabilize the banks and allow them to extend credit to the business
sector without risking the exhaustion of the banks’ capital surplus and
pushing it to the limits of Basel II.
3. Insurance of Issues of New Bonds
The Chair of the ISA, Professor Zohar Goshen, proposed that the
government provide insurance to the issuing of new bonds in the following
manner.65 First, the government would sponsor a mechanism that would
operate for four years. Newly issued bonds by eligible firms would be
placed in a general portfolio, and the institutional investors would invest
and purchase units in the collective portfolio. Eighty percent of the
aggregate value of the bonds in the portfolio would be insured by the
government. In exchange, all issuing firms, participating in the portfolio,
would pay a premium to the government or share with it their profits at the
end of the four year period. Eligible firms would be those with main
operations in Israel.66 Firms, whose bonds are included in the government
insured portfolio, would be subject to limitations concerning the
distribution of dividends, executive compensation and self-dealings
between the firms and their controlling shareholders.

63. Etti Aflalo, MOF Is Not Satisfied with the Lending Provided by the Banks—Will
Establish New Investment Funds of 1 Billion Shekels, THEMARKER, Aug. 5, 2009,
http://www.themarker.com/tmc/article.jhtml?ElementId=skira20090805_1105208
(Hebrew).
64. Press Release, Ministry of Finance, The MOF Provided the Banking System a 6
Billion Shekel Government Guarantee for Raising Capital (Jan. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.mof.gov.il/Lists/List19/Attachments/15/2009-72.doc (Hebrew).
65. ISA, News and Publications, Professor Zohar Goshen, Chair of the ISA:
Controlling Shareholders Should Realize that Part of the Corporation No Longer Belongs
to Them (Apr. 2, 2009), http://www.isa.gov.il/Default.aspx?Site=MAIN&ID=8,175,3257
(last visited May 19, 2009) (Hebrew).
66. In addition, holding firms would be ineligible for this proposal.
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4. Lever Funds
The MOF initiated the creation of Lever Funds. These funds are funds
in which the government invests an aggregate amount of $1.2 billion
dollars (approximately $50-$60 million per fund), and the institutional
investors lever the fund by a significant investment on their part. The fund
shall incorporate as a limited partnership with the manager of the fund
investing at least 1% of its total capital investments and serving as its
unlimited partner and the government and institutional investors holding
interests in the fund as limited partners.67
Lever funds shall invest their money in eligible firms68 for a single
purpose: to recycle corporate bonds and finance voluntary arrangements
between the firms and their bondholders.69 Distributions to the partners in
the fund shall be made pro rata. However, in order to encourage the
institutional investors to participate in the funds, the government shall
assume most of the losses upon the funds’ liquidations and limit its part in
the liquidation distribution in the event there is a surplus.70
The first fund of this sort was launched in March 2009 and raised $0.5
billion dollars.71 In late April 2009, two additional groups were on the
verge of winning bids to manage additional funds.72 However, as of
August 2009 only ten corporations explored the possibility of obtaining
financing from the lever funds. Presumably this is because the bonds

67. MOF, Lever Funds – A Joint Private-Government Investment (2009), available at
http://www.mof.gov.il/Lists/List17/Attachments/9/manof2008.pps (Hebrew).
68. Eligible firms are firms that (a) issued corporate bonds; (b) are not banks, issuers of
financial instruments or government controlled corporations; (c) have at least 50% of their
income (excluding financing income) generated in Israel and 50% of their assets located in
Israel; and (d) the aggregate value of their holdings in securities of other firms does not
exceed 50% of the value of their total assets. Id. at slide 15.
69. The ISA emphasized that while the lever funds were founded for recycling the
existing debt of the firms, the primary goal of the ISA’s insurance for the bonds issuing plan
was aimed at stimulating the bonds market and regaining the investors’ confidence in the
capital market.
70. Upon liquidation, in case of a deficit, the government shall pay the institutional
investors the lower of 90% of a 4% return on their investment or the total distributions the
government had previously received from the fund. In case of a surplus that exceeds 4%,
the government shall limit its part in the distribution to the mean of the actual return and
4%. MOF, supra note 67, at slides 21-22.
71. Etti Aflalo, The Breishit Group Won the Tender for Managing the First Lever Fund,
Mar.
10,
2009,
THEMARKER,
http://www.themarker.com/tmc/article.jhtml?log=tag&ElementId=eaf20090310_87678
(Hebrew).
72. Etti Aflalo, Gabby Tarabelsi’s Group Raised the Requisite Minimum for Founding
Apr.
27,
2009,
a
Lever
Fund,
THEMARKER,
http://www.themarker.com/tmc/article.jhtml?log=tag&ElementId=eaf20090427_37878
(Hebrew).
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market is beginning to show some positive signs of recovery.73
5. Government Financing of Reorganization Workouts
The Official Receiver proposed a plan as follows:74 Within a
designated period of two months, any small or medium sized firm which
feels it is facing financial distress may apply for a governmental loan to pay
off its current debt. A general moratorium shall be statutorily imposed for
this designated period. An applying firm shall submit a general business
plan to the recommending committee, outlining its general plans for
reorganization. All applications will be reviewed by ad hoc committees
comprised of lawyers, economists and accountants with adequate
background in insolvency. These committees shall recommend to a
steering committee, whose members shall be representatives of the Official
Receiver, the MOF, the ISA and the General Federation of Labor, the
amount of loan that should be provided to each firm and outline the terms
that the firm must comply with for being eligible for the loan. The steering
committee will allocate among the various applying firms a relative portion
of a total sum the government shall set for assistance to all firms, based on
priority criteria set by the committee. In exchange, the government shall
receive first priority as a creditor of the firm. In addition, the firm shall
amend its bylaws and issue a golden share to the government, which shall
entitle the government to replace its management should the firm fail to
meet the projected goals in its plan within specified time periods. This plan
obviates the need to initiate official reorganization proceedings in court.
C. Government Legal Initiatives: Credit Officers
Aside from proposals for financial support by the government, the
ISA, as the government agency regulating the disclosure of information by
securities issuing firms, has attempted to promulgate emergency rules that
may facilitate consensual workouts between the issuing firms and their
bondholders. The primary legal obstacles that the parties must overcome
are: (a) the strict disclosure rules of securities law that mandate public
disclosure of any material development, which hinders the quiet and
confidential negotiations between the parties; (b) informal communication
between parties regarding a possible reorganization plan that may implicate
the bondholders in the use of inside information; and (c) the possibility that
73. Most notable among these ten corporations is the real estate giant Africa-Israel. See
also Aflalo, supra note 63 (discussing efforts by the MOF to establish new investment funds
in order to provide non-bank credit to private corporations).
74. This proposal has been submitted to the Minister of Finance in the Official
Receiver’s letter of April 20, 2009 and is on file with the author.
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coordination between the institutional investors regarding their position as
creditors vis-à-vis the firm may violate antitrust law.75
To assist the parties to overcome the aforementioned legal obstacles
the ISA adopted a resolution establishing the function of bondholders’
committees and credit officers.76 This resolution allows an indenture
trustee to appoint a bondholders’ committee for any series of issued and
outstanding bonds. The committee shall be comprised of representatives of
the three largest bondholders of that series. The bondholder’s committee
may appoint a credit officer who shall serve as its representative. The
creditor officer may engage in quiet and informal negotiations with the firm
regarding a restructuring of the bondholders’ rights. The credit officer
shall report to the bondholders’ committee, consult with it and update it
with respect to all the developments in the negotiations with the firm. The
appointment of a bondholders’ committee and of a credit officer, as well as
information obtained by the creditor officer from the firm and reported to
the bondholders’ committee, shall be exempt from disclosure as an
immediate report under the standard rules of securities laws. Also, the
mere introduction by the firm of undisclosed information to the credit
officer and the bondholders’ committee shall not subject the disclosing
persons to liability for violation of the prohibition against the use of inside
information, to the extent that the disclosing person has no reasonable
ground to assume that the recipients of this information shall use it and
trade on it.77
The Antitrust Authority has complemented the ISA by promulgating
an ad-hoc rule for 2009, under which communication and cooperation
75. Aside from overcoming the impediments to reaching a consensual arrangement
between an issuing firm and its bondholders, the ISA concluded that in order to lower the
probability of similar future crises the protection of bondholders’ rights should be fortified
through legislation and regulation. It found that the indenture trustees have thus far
performed relatively poorly in protecting the bondholders’ rights because of the trustees’
dependence on the issuing firm. As a result, in June 2009 the ISA released a draft bill
amending the Securities Act and its rules, so that they empower the indenture trustees with
wider authorities and subject the trustees to the superiority of the bondholders’ meeting and
to explicit statutory fiduciary duties. Draft Bill and Rules pertaining to Bonds (June 1,
2009), available at http://www.isa.gov.il/Download/IsaFile_3618.pdf (last visited July 20,
2009) (Hebrew). An analysis of the current operation of indenture trustees in Israel and the
proposed amendments is beyond the scope of this article.
76. ISA, Plenary Resolution, Resolution re Corporations No. 2009-1(a)—Creating an
Infrastructure for Forming Debt Arrangements for Bondholders in Filing Corporations
(Nov. 25th, 2008), available at http://www.isa.gov.il/Download/IsaFile_3420.pdf (last
visited May 20, 2009) (Hebrew).
77. On June 1, 2009 the ISA released for the public’s comments a draft of a bill
amending the Securities Act that would vest the authority of the credit officer and the
bondholders’ committee in the indenture trustee. ISA, Draft Bill and Rules Pertaining to
Certificates of Obligation, available at http://www.isa.gov.il/Download/IsaFile_3618.pdf
(last visited on June 30, 2009) (Hebrew).
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between members of a bondholders’ committee with respect to the
modification of the payment terms of the bonds shall not constitute an anticompetitive measure in violation of antitrust laws.78
IV. LOW USE OF REORGANIZATION PROCEEDINGS

A. Empirical Data
One interesting phenomenon in the current bonds crisis is the
relatively low use of formal bankruptcy proceedings in the attempts to
resolve specific financial difficulties of bond issuing firms. Based on
official filings with the ISA, as of May 2009 only twenty-eight issuing
firms have commenced some form of negotiation, workout or official
reorganization in order to approve a plan (or arrangement) between the
corporation and its bondholders.79 Of these reporting firms, four firms
were at the time of negotiations in liquidation, two were in official
reorganization in court, and twenty-two were negotiating out of court.80 In
the case of eleven of the reporting firms the parties have eventually filed a
motion with the court under Section 350 of the Companies Act,81 seeking
the official approval of their plan in creditors’ meetings and confirmation
by the court.82 Twelve of these firms were real estate corporations.83 In
thirteen of these cases the plans included delay of payments or specifying

78. Antitrust Authority, Release 1/08—Cooperation between Institutional Investors in
the Modification of Terms in Corporate Bonds (Nov. 25, 2008), available at
http://archive.antitrust.gov.il/files/9675/1-08.pdf (last visited on May 20, 2009) (Hebrew).
79. ISA, Economic Department, The 2007/2009 Credit Crisis, The Corporate Bonds
Market—Self
Repurchases,
3,
available
at
http://www.isa.gov.il/Download/IsaFile_3963.pdf (last visited on July 20, 2009) (Hebrew).
As of July 2009, the total of firms negotiating an arrangement has increased to 36. Merav
Arlozorov, Debt Arrangements Erased Two Thirds of the Investors’ Money, THEMARKER,
July 20, 2009 at 62 (Hebrew).
80. From an informal inquiry with the ISA I have learned that only in the case of two
firms have the parties employed the ISA’s new credit officer scheme.
81. Section 350 of the Companies Act is the general provision of this Act, which
facilitates any compromise or arrangement between a corporation and its shareholders or
creditors, regardless of the corporation’s financial state. To the extent the firm is ailing
financially and is seeking temporary relief from its creditors’ collection rights, it may file,
under section 350(b) of this Act, a motion for a moratorium against the creditors. Cases
where the court has ordered a moratorium are regarded as official reorganization cases.
Accordingly, the eleven cases where section 350 has been utilized include the two official
reorganization cases.
82. ISA, supra note 79, at 11. An alternative mechanism for a majoritarian approval of
the modification of the bondholders’ rights, as specified in the indenture, is through a
bondholders’ vote on such a modification under section 35G of the Securities Act.
83. Id.
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installment payments; in eight cases the plans designated collateral to
secure the bondholders’ rights; in seven cases the plans provided for the
issuing of new equity to the bondholders; and in four cases the plans called
for an infusion of fresh capital by the shareholders.84
It appears that both the distressed firms and their bondholders prefer to
avoid a formal bankruptcy resolution.85 Bankruptcy is widely regarded as a
means of last resort. The following paragraph offers several possible
reasons for the seldom use of formal reorganization proceedings to resolve
the financial distress of issuing firms.
B. Reasons for Avoiding Reorganization
Several factors may affect, separately or cumulatively, a firm’s
decision-makers and its creditors to not use formal reorganization
proceedings or at the very least to try to postpone adoption of these
proceedings as long as possible. These factors are: (a) the loss of control
shareholders and management experience in reorganization; (b) uncertainty
concerning the actual rules of Israel’s reorganization law; (c) covenant light
bonds pose a filing obstacle; (d) a general preference of quiet and
consensual workouts; (e) a traditional, cultural, aversion to bankruptcy with
its associated negative stigma; and (f) underestimation of the judiciary’s
competence to handle sophisticated financial matters. These factors are
discussed in detail below.

1. Shareholders’ and Management’s Loss of Control
The most likely candidate to file a bankruptcy petition is the debtor.
The debtor enjoys superior access to the accurate data concerning its own
financial state. Thus, it may move for legal action at the earliest possible
stage, when a reorganization of the firm is still a viable option.86 Indeed, in
84. Id. at 12. Some of the plans contain a combination of several of the above listed
treatments.
85. The total number of firms entering negotiations leading to a reorganization plan,
within bankruptcy or outside thereof (twenty-eight, as of May 2009) is less than 18% of the
number of firms that employed bonds repurchases to balance the decline in their bonds’
market value and the looming financial distress it signaled (161 firms). The number of
firms that entered formal bankruptcy (six, as of May 2009) is less than 4% of the number of
firms repurchasing their bonds. See supra text accompanying note 53.
86. In the case of a corporate debtor the legal action for salvaging the firm is initiated
primarily by the board of directors. See Brian M. Hunt & Rish Handa, A Critical
Comparison between Australian and Canadian Creditor Protection Regimes: Voluntary
Administration
and
CCAA
9,
n.41
(June
2005),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=888411 (showing the benefits of each country’s regime and how
they can benefit from one another’s experiences).
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practice most reorganization cases are initiated by debtors.87 However,
upon the initiation of a formal insolvency proceeding, the courts appoint a
trustee to control and manage the debtor’s property and business affairs.88
In a liquidation case, the appointment is explicitly provided by the statute.
In reorganization, while not mandated by the legislature, the courts have
nonetheless implemented the practice of appointing a trustee to a firm
The trustee displaces the reigning
undergoing reorganization.89
management and board of directors and takes over the business of the firm
with a primary goal of maximizing the payments for the creditors. The
change of personnel at the helm resonates through the corporate investors.
Shareholders, and especially the controlling shareholders, lose control of
the firm’s business and their influence evaporates almost instantaneously.
The new sheriff in town, that is, the trustee, takes orders from and reports
to the court, in the name of the creditors. It owes no favors to the
shareholders and acts accordingly.
As has been documented and proven empirically, the loss of control
upon initiation of formal insolvency proceedings discourages the
management from filing. For the classic decision makers in a firm, the
managers and the board of directors, their disposition upon the filing makes
such proceedings a course of last resort. Indeed, no person volunteers to
vacate her seat in favor of a newcomer. Entrenchment, to the extent
possible, is more likely. This impedes the probability of a successful
reorganization.90
Alongside the management stand the controlling
shareholders who fear for their control over the firm and, as a result, push
the management to hold and delay any filing for a formal insolvency
proceeding.91 Thus, as long as the relevant financial crisis has not led the
creditors to seriously consider filing for liquidation or receivership, firms in
87. This is indeed the case in the U.S. Stuart C. Gilson, CREATING VALUE THROUGH
CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING: CASE STUDIES IN BANKRUPTCY, BUYOUTS, AND BREAKUPS 23,
Exhibit I1.1 (2001); Ethan S. Bernstein, All’s Fair in Love, War & Bankruptcy? Corporate
Governance Implications of CEO Turnover in Financial Distress, 11 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN.
298, 299, n.3 (2006); Kenneth Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict
in Chapter 11 30 Tbl.3 (Columbia Univ. Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Paper No. 321,
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081661.
88. Companies Ordinance (New Version) § 300 (1983) (Isr.).
89. Subsequently, the regulator provided for the appointment of a trustee in
reorganization. Rule 14 of the Companies Rules (Application for Compromise or
Arrangement) 2002.
90. This has been documented empirically in Barry E. Adler, Vedran Capkun &
Lawrence A. Weiss, Theory and Evidence on the Bankruptcy Initiation Problem (September
2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=795987.
91. Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch & Ning Zhu, The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7
Liquidation v. Chapter 11 Reorganization, 61 J. FIN. 1253 (2006). The delay in initiation is
exacerbated when the concentrated ownership is complemented by a large secured claim.
William J. Donoher, To File or Not To File? Systemic Incentives, Corporate Control, and
the Bankruptcy Decision, 30 J. MAN. 239 (2004).
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Israel rarely initiate formal reorganization proceedings. It is an unfriendly
option for the incumbent decision makers. As a result, this alternative for
resolving financial crises is pushed away even if, objectively, it may be the
appropriate tool for salvaging the firm.
2. The Uncertain State of Israel’s Insolvency Law
In Israel, a financially distressed firm can choose between two main
bankruptcy proceedings. The firm can either enter liquidation or
reorganization. A distressed firm may also be subjected to receivership by
one or more of its secured creditors.92 Liquidation proceedings are
specified in the Companies Ordinance. The ordinance sets forth many of
the traditional aspects that characterize insolvency cases, namely: a stay of
all outstanding proceedings against the debtor,93 appointment of a trustee to
the debtor’s property, filing of proofs of claims, avoidance of precommencement preferences, and orderly distribution of the proceeds of the
debtor’s property among its creditors based on the absolute priority rule.
The reorganization statute is more limited in scope. It basically covers only
two aspects of the reorganization proceedings. First, it provides for a
moratorium on all proceedings against the debtor or its property. Unlike in
liquidation, this moratorium suspends the collection rights of all creditors,
including the secured ones.94 Secondly, the statute authorizes the court to
convene a creditors’ meeting to vote on a proposed arrangement or
settlement.95 Originally, this statute addressed only the procedural aspect
of allowing the creditors’ or shareholders’ meetings to approve a proposed
arrangement or settlement with a corporation. It was not related to
financial distress. Such arrangements were a means to modify existing
rights vis-à-vis the corporation whenever changing business circumstances
required such modifications. To advance reorganization initiatives and
block individual grab of corporate property by a creditor that would
frustrate any reorganization plan, however, the statute was hastily amended
in 1995 authorizing the courts to impose a general moratorium once a
proposal for an arrangement or a settlement has been submitted.96
92. Receivership is subject to the Execution Act. A creditor secured by a floating
charge may file a motion for the appointment of a receiver under section 194 of the
Companies Ordinance.
93. The stay does not preclude secured creditors from foreclosing on their collateral.
Thus, the initiation of a liquidation case notwithstanding, secured creditors may separately
continue or initiate receivership proceedings for collection of their secured claims.
Bankruptcy Ordinance § 20(b), which has been applied to corporate liquidations in CA
5821/92 Houri v. Fischler, [1996] IsrSC 49(5) 833.
94. Companies Act § 350(b), (f).
95. Id. § 350(a).
96. For a general account of the legislative history of Israel’s reorganization law, see
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The important contribution of the statutory moratorium
notwithstanding, the current reorganization legislation in Israel remains
deficient. The statute currently fails to address many operational and
financial issues. Three notable issues that the legislature is yet to address
are: (a) the extension of security interests to property acquired within the
reorganization case; (b) the state of executory contracts in reorganization;
and (c) the confirmation of a reorganization plan over the objection of a
class of creditors.
a. Collateralizing Reorganization-Acquired Property
In Israel, like in the UK, creditors may secure their claim against a
corporation by taking a floating charge in all its present and future acquired
assets. This security interest is most common among bank lenders. If the
loan documents include a contractual provision that limits the corporation
from subjecting any of its property to subsequent security interests without
advance consent of the creditor secured by the floating charge, and this
provision is among the details of the charge filed by the companies
registrar, the floating charge gains priority over any subsequent claims,
secured and unsecured alike,97 except for a purchase money security
interest.98 The reorganization statute is silent with respect to the question
whether newly acquired property during the reorganization proceedings is
subject to a pre-reorganization floating charge or not.99 Thus, it is unclear
whether a potential lender, who has been asked and is contemplating
advancing credit to finance a firm’s operations while undergoing
reorganization can enjoy the priority of a senior security interest in any of
the firm’s assets free and clear of the floating charge. The Supreme Court
has addressed this matter only twice, and reached unclear conclusions. In
the first case, the Court assumed, without discussing the matter in depth,
that the floating charge extends to post-filing acquired property. Based on
this premise, it held that a new lender enjoys priority over the floating
charge but only with respect to any existing going-concern surplus value in
the property. The creditor secured by the floating charge enjoys seniority
in the property’s liquidation value, as of the date of filing.100 Nonetheless,
in a later case the court held that the floating charge ranked lower than the
David Hahn, The Formative Decade of Israel’s Reorganization Law: 1995-2004, 14 INT’L
INSOLVENCY REV. 121 (2005).
97. Companies Ordinance (New Version) § 169(b) (1983) (Isr.).
98. Id. § 169(d).
99. In the U.S., except for proceedings of the original collateral, property newly
acquired in bankruptcy is free from prepetition security interests. BANKRUPTCY CODE, 11
U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
100. CA 6418/93 MAT Investment Corp. v. The Receiver of Carmel Carpets [1995]
IsrSC 49(2) 685.
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claim of contractors who were owed payment for completing the
construction of a real estate project during the reorganization proceedings
of the debtor firm.101 The court did not elaborate whether this priority was
limited to the going-concern surplus of the project. This unclear state of
the law is puzzling for unsecured bondholders as well. To the extent the
bondholders are asked to consider the delay of payments in exchange for
receiving a security interest in property of the debtor, the apparently
unlimited scope of the floating charge becomes a serious hurdle the parties
must overcome. Case law has not contributed to any clarity here.
b. Executory Contracts
A major tool of bankruptcy law that facilitates reorganization is the
ability of a trustee, subject to the approval of the court, to assume or reject
executory contracts to which the debtor is a party.102 Various executory
contracts may be of essential importance for the debtor’s business. A
favorable lease or real property, a license to use certain intellectual
property or an uncompleted construction contract, are small examples of
strategically important contracts for the continuation of a firm’s business as
a going-concern. Any interruption of the flow of the business as a result of
the termination of such a contract may, under the dire circumstances, cause
irreparable damage to the firm’s business operations. Thus, continuation of
existing executory contracts is of extreme practical importance to a
reorganizing firm.103
Israeli law addresses primarily a trustee’s power to reject an executory
contract in liquidation.104 The reorganization statute contains no similar
provision. More importantly, a trustee’s power to assume an executory
contract, and if so, under what terms, is left unanswered by the legislature.
As a result, courts have been reluctant to allow trustees to assume
executory contracts in circumstances where the contract has been breached
prior to the commencement of the formal insolvency case and, invariably,

101. CA 7125/00 The Receiver of the Asphalt Group v. Rostom Shalabane [2002] IsrSC
56(3) 507.
102. Executory contract is widely understood as a contract where “the obligations of
both parties are so unperformed that the failure of either party to complete performance
would constitute a material breach and thus excuse the performance of the other.” Griffel v.
Murphy (In re Wegner), 839 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1988). This builds on the definition
initially suggested by Countryman. Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy:
Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973).
103. George G. Triantis, Termination Rights in Bankruptcy: The Story of Stephen
Perlman v. Catapult Entertainment, Inc., in BANKRUPTCY LAW STORIES 55 (Robert K.
Rasmussen ed., 2007).
104. Companies Ordinance (New Version) §§ 360-65 (1983) (Isr.).
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respect the non-breaching party’s right to rescind the contract.105 Thus, the
future of contracts that were breached because of the debtor’s inability to
pay as a result of its financial distress, is completely dependent on the good
will of the non-breaching party to overlook the breach. Similarly, absent
any statutory limitation to the contrary, the courts enforce insolvency ipso
facto termination clauses.106 Given the wide practice of including such
clauses in business contracts, the prospect of assuming executory contracts
and preserving the going-concern value they generate is meager. The risk
of losing important executory contracts is thus another concern that deters
the corporate management and their creditors from turning to formal
bankruptcy proceedings.
c. Inter-Class Holdouts
To approve a proposed reorganization plan the creditors must
convene and vote on its terms. For this purpose, the creditors are classified
into separate meetings. Creditors sharing homogeneous interests are
classified together.107 Within each class the proposed plan must achieve a
requisite majority.108 The problem arises though when one or more of the
classes voted against the plan. This creates a challenge as it impedes the
practical ability to confirm the plan. This problem is exacerbated as the
number of classes increases, thereby also increasing the risk of holdout.109
By requiring the unanimous consent of all voting classes, Israel fails to
provide workable tools for the confirmation of reorganization plans in
circumstances of inter-class disagreements or conflicts of interests.

105. See, e.g., Bankr. (TA) 2166/03, Motion 22204/03 Chuhodruglu Aluminum v. The
Interim Liquidator of Hiram Gat [2004] (unpublished opinion).
106. See, e.g., Motion 6483/97 In re Home Mart [1997] (unpublished opinion).
107. This is the general rule for meetings of shareholders or creditors under section 350
of the Companies Act. See CA 70/92 Clal Indus. v. Leumi Pia [1993] IsrSC 47(2) 329
(holding that shareholders holding both Class A and Class B voting stock should be
classified separately from the rest of the Class B shareholders); CA 332/88 Bank Leumi v.
The Receiver of Kochav Hashomron [1990] IsrSC 44(1) 254 (holding that all secured
creditors can be classified together, except Bank Leumi who was the beneficiary of a
personal guarantee and thus differed in its economic interests from the other secured
creditors). But see BANKRUPTCY CODE, 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (2006) (“[A] plan may place a
claim or an interest in a particular class only if such claim or interest is substantially similar
to the other claims or interests of such class.”).
108. Under section 350(i) of the Companies Act the requisite majority is a majority in
person of the actually voting creditors, sans abstainers, who hold 75% or more of the claims
voted in the meeting.
109. Any increase of the total number of individuals whose personal consent is required
for approving a proposed decision exacerbates the cost of holdout. Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts
and Freeriders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1991).
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3. Covenant Light Bonds
Management and shareholders wish to delay for as long as possible
the filing for reorganization of their firm in order not to lose their control.
Consequently, the task of filing for formal proceedings is one left for the
creditors. Yet, in the current bonds crisis, bondholders of some firms
suddenly discovered that despite the financial deterioration of the issuing
firm their legal options are limited. The debenture, under the terms of
which their bonds were issued, lacks common financial covenants that
demand the maintaining of certain financial ratios and provide that failure
to oblige constitutes an event of default and acceleration of their entire
claim.110 As discussed earlier, the issuing of commercial bonds in Israel is
a relatively young practice. Preliminary negotiations between issuing firms
and the indenture trustee (on behalf of the investors) on the terms of the
offered bonds were yet to be perfected. Occasionally, the latter have not
insisted on the inclusion of contractual clauses commonly found in private
loan agreements.111 As a result, as long as the issuing firm has not yet
reached a date of payment of interest to the bondholders, the latter were in
no legal position to declare a default by the firm. Subsequently, the path to
initiating formal bankruptcy proceedings appeared blocked for the time
being.
4. Preference of Unofficial Workouts
Regardless of the legal details and mechanisms of formal insolvency
proceedings, bondholders are generally reluctant to enter these
proceedings. Their general preference is to negotiate with the issuing firm
quietly and informally in search of a consensual restructuring for the terms
of the bonds.112 The out of court workout has been further facilitated by the
110. The phenomenon of covenant-light loans is common practice even in sophisticated
and developed financial markets like the U.S. The leniency there was, inter alia, a result of
the desire of managers of hedge funds and private equity to close as many deals as possible
and get paid their bonuses as a result thereof. Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 in Transition—
From Boom to Bust and into the Future, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 375, 380-83 (2007).
111. A recent study of the financing of LBOs between 2001 to 2006 confirms that
covenant-light loans were typical for loans originated by institutional investors and were
accompanied with higher interest spreads. Joseph R. Mason, Wei-Ling Song & Jerry Cao,
Business Aggression, Institutional Loans, and Credit Crisis: Evidence from Lending
Practices
in
Leveraged
Buyouts
3
(2009),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1362421. See also Adam Gallagher,
Covenant Lite: The High-Water Mark of the LBO Market?, 26-6 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 30
(2007) (discussing how the American financing trend of covenant lite leveraged loans has
hit Europe resulting in several “covenant lite” senior financing deals in the European
market).
112. For empirical data on out of court workouts compared to formal bankruptcy
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ISA in its adoption of the credit officer mechanism.113 The bondholders
feel that they may reach their goals without the need to utilize official
reorganization proceedings. The official reorganization proceedings may
nonetheless be used by the parties, in a prepackaged format, upon reaching
a consensual path. In order to simplify the confirmation of the negotiated
solution and have it bind all dissenting creditors, the parties may seek the
voting rules and court approval provided for under section 350 of the
Companies Act (the section that also constitutes the reorganization
statute.)114 This use of section 350 of the Companies Act is essentially a
prepackaged reorganization proceeding.115
As for the risks of unilateral filings for reorganization by the issuing
firms, the institutional investors count on their leverage as repeat players to
reliably threaten the issuing firms from taking any such measures.116 Given
that these investors are well organized and primary holders of corporate
bonds in the Israeli market,117 the issuing firms will likely hesitate to upset
the institutional investors and waste their good standing therewith. Any
subsequent debt financing will backfire against the issuing firm, as it will
be required to raise the interest rate on that debt instrument. The firms are
thus wary of unilaterally initiating a formal reorganization proceeding and
risking the ire of the institutional investors.118
5. Cultural Rubicon
Another reason for the aversion of formal reorganization proceedings
is a cultural barrier. The Israeli business world regards formal insolvency
proceedings, see supra Part IV.A.
113. See supra Part III.C (discussing how the ISA resolution established the function of
bondholders’ committees and credit officers).
114. See supra Part IV.A (empirical data on the use of section 350 for concluding the
negotiations).
115. John McConnell & Henri Servaes, The Economics of Pre-packaged Bankruptcy, in
CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 322 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari
& Lawrence A. Weiss eds., 1996); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at
Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673, 679 (2003).
116. Neil Gunningham, Private Ordering, Self-Regulation and Future Markets: A
Comparative Study of Informal Social Control, 13 L. & POLICY 297 (1991).
117. For the segmentation of the holdings of corporate bonds in Israel, see supra note 25.
118. But see John C. Coffee, Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The
Problem of Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1207 (1991) (discussing the coercive forces that may lead bondholders, including
institutional investors, to accept haircuts and other informal workouts proposed by a
distressed issuing firm, when the firm’s management may reliably threaten to file for
bankruptcy). The concern raised by Coffee & Klein is strong in the U.S. because managers
are less averse from turning to bankruptcy. See supra Part IV.B.1 (discussing how the loss
of control upon initiation of formal insolvency proceedings often discourages Israeli
management from filing for bankruptcy).
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proceedings as a plague. Investors, controlling shareholders, accounting
firms and creditors alike feel that entering a formal proceeding is always,
under any circumstances, the last resort and the least desired alternative.119
In their eyes, the initiation of a formal insolvency proceeding itself is
destructive. The formal proceedings can do no good for the firm. The very
initiation of such proceedings is official evidence that the firm is insolvent
and that its viability as a going-concern is questionable.120 The filing for
bankruptcy will only exacerbate the firm’s delicate standing vis-à-vis its
suppliers, employees and customers, many of whom will seek doing
business elsewhere.121 This dramatic event in the life of a firm marks the
beginning of its end. The general understanding is that any formal
bankruptcy case is the ultimate failure of a debtor. Correspondingly, the
market reaction to an announcement that a formal insolvency proceeding
has been commenced is a steep drop in the valuation of the firm’s securities
and a further loss to the investors. Thus, it is widely believed and accepted
among the creditors that the longer formal proceedings can be avoided, the
better. Accordingly, in the recent bonds crisis, the bondholders preferred
any alternative — a consensual out-of-court workout with the firm or an
ad-hoc governmental bailout plan — over formal bankruptcy proceedings.
In short, no one wishes to come near bankruptcy because it is considered an
illegitimate option for a functioning business.122
This approach, although widely accepted and relied upon in practice,
represents a culturally erroneous perception of bankruptcy and its essence.
The popular approach, even shared by many lawyers, is that the initiation
of bankruptcy is the drawing of a line between two periods in the life of a
debtor firm. Before the commencement of the proceedings the firm may
have been ailing but, nonetheless, an operating business. Upon the filing

119. See Amir Helmer, How to Reorganize a Failing Real Estate Corporation (Oct. 10,
2004),
available
at
http://www.haaretz.com/hasite/pages/ShArtPE.jhtml?itemNo=486280&contrassID=2&sub
ContrassID=10&sbSubContrassID=0 (Hebrew) (debtors file with the courts petitions for
formal bankruptcy proceedings only after the banks make it clear to the controlling
shareholders that the business can no longer be run as usual).
120. In the Globes-PWC joint research, the only two alternatives of action for
bondholders analyzed were an out of court workout or formal liquidation. GLOBES
RESEARCHES & PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 40, at 2223. This indicates that
even the most sophisticated and respectable accounting firms in Israel fail to fully
comprehend the legal option of formal reorganization and its positive potential.
121. Id. at 22.
122. The current general resentment of insolvency proceedings in Israel is reminiscent of
the public atmosphere in the U.S. in the 1960s. See Miller, supra note 110, at 376 (“[I]n the
1960s, bankruptcy was a small, arcane, undesired practice area. After the Second World
War, the volume of bankruptcies and particularly old Chapter XI cases was very minor.
Credit was relatively tight. Major law firms and accounting firms shunned the area of
bankruptcy. The stigma of bankruptcy was very much to be avoided.”)
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for bankruptcy, the firm loses its good standing as it publicly proclaims its
failure.
Unfortunately, this approach overlooks the detailed legal
mechanism of bankruptcy and the fundamental values it is intended to
promote. Regardless of the legal functions of bankruptcy proceedings and
its virtues, in the business world, much like the consumer context, the term
“bankruptcy” connotes failure and financial disaster.123 The roots for this
popular view may be historic and may have lost legal ground over the
years.124 Nonetheless, in the eyes of a layperson, bankruptcy is a
predicament one should avoid.125 Because the business world has not
changed its traditional hostility and suspicion towards bankruptcy, any firm
and its creditors who wish to resolve the firm’s financial difficulties
successfully, should distance the firm from such proceedings. Thus far,
this popular attitude, regardless of its merit, has indeed kept the
bondholders away from the bankruptcy courts.
6. Underestimation of the Courts’ Competence
The parties involved in the bonds crisis, debtors and creditors alike,
generally display skepticism regarding the courts’ competence to handle
acute economic matters and reach optimal decisions.126 The general
concern is that judges who lack expertise in evaluating firms, analyzing
their financial statements, and dissecting their periodical performances will
be called upon to decide the overall fate of such firms.127 Any initiation of
123. Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Less Stigma or More
Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy
Filings, 59 STAN. L. REV. 213 (2006).
124. For the influence of moral norms on the social psychology pertaining to bankruptcy,
see Gordon Bermant, Bankruptcy by the Numbers: What’s Stigma Got to Do with It?, 22-6
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 22 (2003).
125. American non-legal professionals exhibit a similar misunderstanding of Chapter 11
and its virtues. The (erroneous) general belief among non-legal persons is that the filing for
Chapter 11 doomed Lehman Brothers and that major distressed businesses should stay away
from bankruptcy as long as they can. Stephen J. Lubben, Systemic Risk & Chapter 11, 82
TEMPLE L. REV. 433 (2009). See also Horacio Spector, Don’t Cry for me Argentina:
Economic Crises and the Restructuring of Financial Property, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 771 (2009) (arguing that a bankruptcy paradigm can maintain a separation of powers,
reduce rent-seeking by small interest groups, and mitigate the overall damage to the
financial system caused by the economic crisis).
126. See, e.g., Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for
Generalist Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity & Judicial Training on Appeals
(George Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 09-07, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1319888 (concluding that there is
support for the hypothesis that some antitrust cases are too complicated for generalist
judges).
127. This concern is found worldwide. See, e.g., Alan Bancaud & Anne Boigeol, A New
Judge for a New System of Economic Justice, in PROFESSIONAL COMPETITION AND
PROFESSIONAL POWER 104 (Yves Dezalay & David Sugarman eds. 1995) (discussing the
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formal insolvency proceedings moves the court to the front, and vests in the
judge the authority to make all the critical calls, whether operational,
investment or financing.128 The business parties resent the thought of a
court running the business de facto and perceive this alternative inferior to
others.129 Obviously, the preferred method for resolving their financial
issues is through a consensual negotiated plan of payment.130 Yet, the
second best alternative in the eyes of the market is a government brokered
plan, such as the establishment of lever funds or guaranteeing the value of
newly issued bonds whose proceeds will retire the outstanding debt on the
old (and payable) bonds. The common denominator of these plans is that
they are orchestrated and planned to be managed or supervised by branches
of the government. These plans are traceable to the Ministry of Finance.
The common view is that the persons behind the designing of these plans
and their execution are ranking officers in the Ministry of Finance, whose
economic grasp is far superior to that of any judge in the judicial system.
The MOF employs some of the brighter economic minds in Israel’s market.
Thus, any financial crisis that the major firms are experiencing would
likely be treated more efficiently by the MOF or the ISA and their staffs
than by the courts. Also, the government addresses the crisis from a macro
point of view, while courts always focus on the specific case at hand and
miss the larger picture of the economy as a whole. Thus, a systemic bailout
program launched by the government is perceived a preferable alternative
to a case by case attempt to salvage the ailing firms and the investment of
the bondholders (and directly of all the public who invest their long term

change that has occurred in the position and the role of the French Judiciary). See also
Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review of Economic Analyses, 1 YALE J. REG. 43 (1983)
(discussing how judicial review of economic analyses is an increasingly important task for
American federal appellate courts, which requires judges to understand often arcane
economic issues, and providing some suggestions for how to approach mixed issues of law
and economics).
128. In enacting chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code Congress’ original intention
was actually to relegate the bankruptcy courts to the role of mere adjudicators of
controversies while leaving the operational aspects of the case to the professional parties. In
practice, however, this intent has not worked out. See Harvey R. Miller, The Changing
Face of Chapter 11: A Reemergence of the Bankruptcy Judge as Producer, Director, and
Sometimes Star of the Reorganization Passion Play, 69 AM. BANKR. L. J. 431 (1995)
(describing the active roles bankruptcy judges play in Chapter 11 proceedings).
129. For a refute of the rhetoric emphasizing the judges’ lack of expertise, see Edward K.
Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519 (2008). However, recent
experimental studies cast doubts whether specialized judicial experience bears added value
for calculated decision making. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich,
Inside the Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1230 (2006); Chris Guthrie,
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, The “Hidden Judiciary”: An Empirical
Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L. J. 1477 (2009).
130. GLOBES RESEARCHES & PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 40.

HAHNFINAL

762

6/10/2010 10:52:42 AM

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 12:3

savings in funds managed by the institutional investors).131
A testament to both the cultural barrier and the underestimation of the
courts’ competence is the Official Receiver’s initiative for a government
financing of reorganization workouts.132 The parameters of the Official
Receiver’s proposal effectively emulate main elements of a formal
reorganization proceeding (moratorium, priority financing), but without the
actual resort to the court’s jurisdiction. This proposal is a surrogate to the
path the Official Receiver understands that the parties wish to avoid.
V. THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
The preceding part outlined various explanations for the avoidance of
formal insolvency proceedings by firms and their bondholders. These
explanations may be summarized under two general categories: legal
reasons and extra-legal reasons. The legal reasons include the uncertainty
of the current state of insolvency law in Israel and the personal cost for
managements and controlling shareholders once official proceedings have
commenced. The extra legal reasons include the general expectation for a
wide scale governmental intervention in the crisis, a cultural aversion from
the stigma of bankruptcy, and holding face by the institutional investors
who fear that setting a precedent of writing off significant debt while
allowing the survival of their debtor firm will saddle them in future cases.
All parties were well aware that paying off the bonds of many firms
was practically impossible and thus some modifications must have been
made. The question then was what type of modifications and whose
supervision would best serve the firms and their creditors. Should the
government launch an ad-hoc plan for backing the firms or is a case-bycase approach through bankruptcy proceedings preferable? I believe there
is no solution that is clearly and convincingly superior to all others. This
part will outline the relative advantages and costs of each approach. Given
the positive potential of both channels the following part will recommend
certain improvements and a change of attitude so that firms and their
creditors can benefit from the relative advantages of a (case-by-case)
bankruptcy resolution for the firms’ financial distress.133
131. For a similar general understanding in the U.S. concerning the treatment of the
systemic financial crisis, see Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Bankruptcy or Bailouts? (U
Penn. Inst. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 09-11, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1362639.
132. See supra Part III.B.5 (discussing the Official Receiver’s proposal in detail).
133. See also Bastian Breitenfellner & Niklas Wagner, Government Intervention in
Response to the Subprime Financial Crisis: The Good into the Pot, the Bad into the Crop
(Feb. 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1334804
(cautioning against a wide scale substitution of bankruptcy resolution for financial distress
by government sponsored rescue packages).
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A. The Advantages of Government Intervention
All variations of government intervention across the border to rescue
ailing firms from defaulting on their issued and payable bonds enjoy certain
advantages over the resolution of the crisis through the bankruptcy judicial
system. These advantages are: (a) the presence and involvement of a
strong and able financial guarantor; (b) reduction in administrative costs
due to streamlining of payable corporate debt; (c) an inter-firm consistent
treatment of creditors; (d) a quick implementation of the rescue initiative;
and (e) the move is likely to stimulate the economy.
1. Governmental Financial Backing
Governmental financial support, either through an insurance of new
bonds issues or through subsidized funds that infuse fresh capital to the
distressed firms,alleviates the firms' burdensome debt. The government’s
support lowers the firms’ cost of capital and allows them to continue their
operations undisturbed.134 In contrast, when a firm resorts to court
supervised bankruptcy, as a practical matter, it must obtain financing from
a financial lender. The availability of such financing during a general
financial crisis is limited. Also, such financing is more expensive than the
government’s subsidy.135
2. Saving Administrative Costs
A wide scope government intervention spares the firm and its
creditors the need to litigate the specific financial crisis of the firm in court.
This removes the need for a particular judicial measurement of the concrete
financial position of each firm. Administering a wide-scale crisis on a
case-by-case basis clogs the judicial pipeline and increases the
administrative costs since it requires retaining the services of lawyers,
accountants and financial advisors on behalf of the litigating parties. A
government plan for all firms suffering the crisis is a general and unified
treatment that bypasses the microscope examination of each particular firm.

134. But see id. (arguing that government financial support for distressed firms should be
deliberately supplied at a significant cost to those firms). For a proposal to lower the cost of
banks’ recapitalization through finance supplied by the private sector, see John C. Coates,
IV & David S. Scharfstein, Lowering the Cost of Bank Recapitalization, 26 YALE J. REG.
373 (2009).
135. On the other hand, the amount of financing a firm would need in a bankruptcy case
is smaller because, unlike in the case of governmental support, it needs the cash only for its
operations and not for paying off its outstanding debts. Skeel & Ayotte, supra note 131.
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3. Inter-Firm Consistent Treatment of Creditors
A wide scale government plan of relief for distressed firms allows
the creditors to enjoy the same treatment and grants them an opportunity to
save their sunken investments in a consistent manner.136 Many creditors,
and particularly institutional investors, invest in bonds of various firms.
Such creditors look at their overall portfolio of bonds and measure the
returns or losses on the portfolio. The consistent and unified approach
afforded by government intervention ensures these creditors the salvation
of their investments (and indirectly those of all employees who invest their
retirement savings in the institutional investors). In contrast, judicial
resolution of financial distress varies across different judges.137 Moreover,
in treating the creditors’ claims on a case-by-case basis the judicial system
is prone to error in certain cases and thus decreases the overall return on the
public’s investments.138 Thus, per-crisis in the market, a government plan
enjoys the upper hand in its clarity and predictability.139
4. Quick Implementation
Once adopted formally, a governmental rescue plan may be
implemented rather quickly. Either the governmental support will apply
automatically to any eligible firm or the firm will contact the governmental
agency that is in charge of implementing the plan and prove its eligibility.
Because a governmental bailout applies evenly to all ailing firms, it is less
threatening from a debtor firm’s perspective. Such a plan is less
stigmatizing than an official judicial bankruptcy proceeding and it does not

136. In contrast, bankruptcy cases are governed on a case-by-case basis, by potentially
different judges across the country, which makes it difficult to apply a coordinated reply to a
wide scale economic crisis. See Lubben, supra note 125, at 440-41 (“[T]he fractured nature
of a series of bankruptcy cases within an industry makes it difficult to implement a
coordinated policy response across multiple firms. . . .”).
137. See, e.g., Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch, and Ning Zhu, The Costs of Bankruptcy, 61 J. FIN.
1253, 1297 (2006) (“[W]hether unsecured creditors recover more or less seems to relate to
which judge is drawn.”).
138. Even where creditors hold a portfolio of bonds the losses of errant judicial decisions
in particular cases do not necessarily balance by the positive results generated in the cases
adjudicated correctly and effectively, due to a general bias of the judicial system. See
Nicola Gennaioli and Stefano Rossi, Judicial Discretion in Corporate Bankruptcy (Jan.
2009),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1051441
(“[J]udicial idiosyncrasies do not average out just like pure noise. . . . Chapter 11 is
systematically pro-debtor. . . .”).
139. The government’s per-crisis intervention is nonetheless susceptible to the costs of
ad-hoc legislation when comparing the treatment of creditors in different economic crises.
See Part V.B.3 infra (discussing the limits of consensual workouts regulated by credit
officers when compared to reorganization proceedings).
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require, per se, any change of control of the firm.140 Thus, the timely
initiation of the governmental rescue plan appears more promising than the
initiation of a judicial bankruptcy proceeding. Moreover, the terms of a
governmental rescue are predetermined by the government and are not
negotiated with any specific firm. This may expedite the implementation
of the plan and eliminate the need for lengthy negotiations between the
parties entailed by a formal bankruptcy resolution.141
5. Stimulating the Economy
A governmental rescue intervention typically draws the full
attention of the domestic media. All the players in the capital market rely
on the terms of the government’s plan and are inspired by it. A wide scale
governmental support revives the confidence of investors in the economic
activity and reenergizes the capital markets.142 In this sense, a constructive
contribution of the government’s intervention lies in the stimulation of a
cash constrained economy.143 The panic effect that is exacerbated once an
economic crisis escalates to a national level is best squelched by a
government pacifier.
B. Costs and Limitations of Intervention
Part III has shown that the government considered various economic
and legal measures of intervention in light of the bonds crisis. A broad
brushed financial intervention bears the following costs: (a) it uses
taxpayers’ money to subsidize losses in the private sector; and (b) it
140. However, a sponsoring government may press for change of personnel at the
corporate helm, as was the case recently with GM. Mike Allen & Josh Gerstein, GM’s CEO
Resigns at Obama’s Behest, POLITICO, March 29, 2009, available at
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0309/20625.html. Unlike in Israel and many other
countries, in the U.S. Chapter 11 negates this consideration as it provides for the
preservation of the debtor’s management as debtor-in-possession. See BANKRUPTCY CODE,
11 U.S.C. § 1107 (2006) (allowing debtor-in-possession to retain management).
141. See Luigi Zingales, Why Paulson is Wrong, in THE FIRST GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
OF THE 21ST CENTURY, PART II: JUNE—DECEMBER, 2008, 277 (Andrew Felton & Carmen M.
Reinhart eds. 2008) (assuming that Chapter 11 negotiations would take months).
142. See, e.g., Ron Stein & Eran Peer, The Lever Funds are Under Way: At Least 80% of
Their Money will be Invested Directly in Debt Arrangements, GLOBES, Jan. 1, 2009,
available at http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000412939 (Hebrew) (the
Ministry of Finance is providing fresh credit to the business sector in order to stimulate the
economy).
143. But see Luigi Zingales, Plan B, 5(6) THE ECONOMISTS’ VOICE (Oct. 2008),
available at http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol5/iss6/art4 (arguing that the vast majority of the
government’s rescue money is being used by the rescued financial institutions to pay off
their existing debts rather than vitalizing the economy through the supply of fresh financing
to the markets).
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amplifies management’s moral hazard of risk taking. In addition, the new
legal alternative advocated by the ISA, pursuant to which the bonds crisis
would be resolved through consensual workouts via the credit officer
mechanism, is a poor substitute for formal bankruptcy as it is shorthanded
in comparison to bankruptcy. These shortfalls are discussed below.
1. Use of Taxpayers’ Money
The most obvious cost of a government bailout is the immediate
burden it places on the country’s treasury.144 Taxpayer money is relied
upon to remedy the mistakes of the private sector.145 While this current
burden may pay off in the future, if and when it stabilizes the economy and
reenergizes it, it is nonetheless questionable whether, as a matter of
principle and as a philosophical matter, the general public should serve,
after the fact, as a general guarantor of players in the private sector.146
Moreover, on a practical basis, there is a limit to the amounts the
government can allow itself to spend on the rescuing of distressed
businesses.147
2. Moral Hazard
Ken Ayotte and David Skeel are among the latest commentators to
elaborate on the moral hazard problem that a governmental bailout would
produce.148 Ex ante, the expectation for a general bailout in a wide

144. Certain commentators associate this argument politically with the Republican Party.
See Howard L. Rosenthal, Letter: Republican Opposition to Debt Reduction in Financial
Crises—The Great Depression and Today 5(5) THE ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, (Oct. 2008)
available at http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol5/iss5/art12/ (describing Republican party’s
reaction to government intervention during national financial crises).
145. See Zingales, supra note 141 (describing costs to taxpayers of AIG government
bailout).
146. Altman & Philippon advocate the use of taxpayer’s money, through a government
DIP loan to GM inside Chapter 11, but only because of the collapse of the DIP-finance
market as a result of the general financial crisis. Edward I. Altman & Thomas Philippon,
Where Should the Bailout Stop, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A
FAILED SYSTEM 353 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds. 2009).
147. This may explain recent hesitations in the U.S. from bailing out additional faltering
firms. See Dean Foust & Theo Francis, CIT: Not Too Big to Fail, BUS. WK., Jul. 13, 2009,
available
at
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/jul2009/db20090713_500893.htm
(also citing sources who call for utilizing a prepackaged bankruptcy in lieu of a bailout).
148. Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 131. The problem discussed in the main text is a
debtor’s moral hazard problem. In a somewhat different context the International Monetary
Fund’s sovereign-debt bailouts have raised the concern of investors’ moral hazard. See,
e.g., Jong-Wha Lee & Kwanho Shin, IMF Bailouts and Moral Hazard, 27 J. INT’L MONEY
& FIN. 816 (2008) (finding differences between lending spreads and underlying risks
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economic distress encourages managers of the largest firms to overinvest
and take excessive risks in belief that eventually the government will not
let their firms fall.149 Managers and directors of such firms adopt the
mantra that their firms are simply “too big to fail.”150 This risk is magnified
by the managers’ modern days’ inclination to overly risk the firms’
operation in expectation of reaping increased executive compensation
calculated on the basis of (shortsighted) high returns.151 Moreover, as
Ayotte and Skeel argue, ex post the managers and directors may exacerbate
the moral hazard problem by deliberately allowing the firm to deteriorate
further, in order to paradoxically enhance its chances of receiving the
government aid it seeks.152 That is, the firm races itself to distress to pass
the dubious “poor firm in need of government bailout” threshold. This
behavior only worsens the firm’s position at a time where quick
reconstructive actions of its managers and directors could have righted the
ship.
3. The Limits of Consensual Workouts
As a legal response to the current bonds crisis the ISA regulated the
consistent with moral hazard caused by expectations of IMF lending). For a historical (and
skeptical) account of general bailouts and their adverse effect on managements of the
railroad industry, see Joseph R. Mason & Daniel A. Schiffman, Too Big to Fail,
Government Bailouts and Managerial Incentives: The Case of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation Assistance to the Railroad Industry during the Great Depression, in TOO BIG
TO FAIL: POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS 49 (Benton E. Gup ed. 2004)
(finding that railroads reduced maintenance, contrary to long-term solvency, when
assistance rather than bankruptcy procedures were used).
149. But see Tito Cordella & Eduardo L. Yeyati, Bank Bailouts: Moral Hazard vs. Value
Effect, 12 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 300 (2003) (arguing that the risk-reducing value of a
central bank bailout outweighs the costs of moral hazard in adverse macroeconomics
circumstances). In a similar vein, see also Steven B. Kamin, Identifying the Role of Moral
Hazard in International Financial Markets (FRB Int’l Fin. Discussion Paper No. 736,
2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=333382 (disputing
the evidence for moral hazard caused by IMF-led financing packages).
150. For an example of the regulators’ dilemma whether to bail out or not, based on this
sense, see Peter S. Goodman, Too Big to Fail?, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/20/weekinreview/20goodman.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1
(emphasizing that bailouts and massive economic collapse are both contrary to American
political ideology); David Henry, Stanley Reed, Cristina Lindblad & Paula Lehman, Too
WK.,
Jan.
24,
2008,
available
at
Big
to
Fail,
BUS.
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_05/b4069032985454.htm (highlighting
the extreme consequences inherent in either option a central bank can pursue in financial
crises).
151. See, e.g., Kevin Dowd, Moral Hazard and the Financial Crisis, (CRIS Discussion
2008),
available
at
Paper
Series—2008.VI,
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/business/cris/papers/2008-6.pdf (arguing that moral hazard is
fundamental to analyzing bailout policies).
152. Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 131.
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operation of credit officers.153 The wide perception in the market is that
this legal arrangement is superior to official reorganization proceedings.
The scheme of credit officers facilitates a quiet workout between a firm and
its bondholders without resorting to judicial intervention and the disruption
of the normal course of the firm’s business. Much like any consensual
workout, the scheme of credit officers is indeed a constructive contribution
to the successful resolution of payment crises in public corporations.
However, this scheme and any other form of workout fall short once
coordination problems154 and conflicts of interest between the bondholders
and other creditors, such as bank lenders, or between the bondholders interse abound.155 In such circumstances classes of creditors that oppose the
proposal negotiated between the firm and (a class of) its bondholders may
effectively impede the proposal by asserting their own collection rights.156
In such situations, which are common in practice,157 the scheme of credit
153. See supra Part III.C (describing the ISA’s regulation of credit officers).
154. See Robert Gertner & David Scharfstein, A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of
Reorganization Law, 46 J. FIN. 1189 (1991) (presenting a model highlighting coordination
inefficiencies faced by public debtholders during the workout process).
155. On the holdout problem in consensual bondholders’ workouts, see Coffee & Klein,
supra note 118, at 1232-42 (illustrating the problems introduced by “vulture funds” in a
bondholder workout). In the U.S., the problem of bondholders’ holdout is exacerbated
because section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa–77bbbb, rejects the
majoritarian vote and prohibits any modification of the original payment terms of the bonds
issued thereunder absent the individual consent of each bondholder. See Mark J. Roe, The
Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232 (1987) (advocating a repeal of
individualized bondholder choice as it contributes to unnecessary bankruptcies); George W.
Shuster, Jr., The Trust Indenture Act and International Debt Restructurings, 14 ABI L. REV.
431 (2006) (describing the uncertain place individualized bondholder choice holds in
modern debt restructurings). On the coordination problem in workouts between
bondholders, see Robert Gertner & David Scharfstein, A Theory of Workouts and the Effects
of Reorganization Law, 46 J. FIN. 1189 (1991) (finding that coordination inefficiencies are
not mitigated by feasible means for restructuring public debt).
156. For an empirical support of this argument, see Stuart C. Gilson, Kose John & Larry
H.P. Lang, Troubled Debt Restructurings: An Empirical Study of Private Reorganization of
Firms in Default, in BANKRUPTCY & DISTRESSED RESTRUCTURINGS 77 (Edward I. Altman
ed., 1998). For a proposal for facilitating cooperative collective action outside of
bankruptcy and overcoming the self-interested private enforcement by individual creditors,
see Claire Finkelstein, Note, Financial Distress as a Noncooperative Game: A Proposal for
Overcoming Obstacles to Private Workouts, 102 YALE L.J. 2205 (1993) (advising that debt
contracts incorporate a clause suspending creditors’ state law collection rights for a fixed
period of time).
157. See, e.g., Michael Rochwerger, Polishek Holds Enough Cash to Pay Its
Bondholders by the End of February—the Banks are Refusing to Release the Cash, THE
MARKER,
Jan.
2,
2009,
available
at
http://www.themarker.com/tmc/article.jhtml?log=tag&ElementId=mr20090201_111121
(last visited June 1, 2009) (Hebrew) (the Polishek case exemplifies a conflict of interests
between the bondholders and the bank, which threatens to thwart a consensual
arrangement). It is a common understanding in the capital market that without the consent
of the bank lenders any proposed workout between bondholders is liable to fail. GLOBES
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officers fails to solve the crisis and save the firm.158
In addition, bankruptcy equips the parties with the constructive
benefits of a wide moratorium.159 Thus, while the negotiations between the
parties take place, no single creditor whose claim is due and payable may
disrupt the negotiations by creating a run at the debtor’s assets. The
consensual workout alternative does not provide such a safety net and is
thus wholly dependent on the good will and restraint of each and every
creditor of the debtor. Finally, bankruptcy laws benefit the financers of a
distressed debtor by according them a high priority in the order of claims.160
No such benefits may be obtained, however, in an out-of-court workout.
VI. THE CASE FOR USING REORGANIZATION LAW

A. Reorganization Law: The Cure, Not the Plague
By and large, the Israeli business sector has practically rejected formal
bankruptcy proceedings as a mechanism for resolving the financial distress
of viable firms and promoting a reorganization plan for the benefit of the
firm and its creditors. The popular, yet completely errant, perception is that
official bankruptcy proceedings, of any kind, are a death writ for a debtor
firm who shall enter such proceedings. The reasons for this perception
have been discussed in Part IV. In the previous part, I have shown that
alternative mechanisms, like government intervention or out-of-court
workouts, are far from being optimal solutions for business financial
distress as they suffer from numerous shortcomings. In my eyes, ruling out
the use of bankruptcy proceedings for resolving the bonds crisis is
erroneous as it unjustifiably narrows the available channels for resolving
the crisis and abandons the very mechanism that was designed specifically
for such situations.
I believe that all players, the debtor firms, their creditors (institutional

RESEARCHES & PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 40, at 15, 35-37 (Hebrew).
158. For a proposition that repeat workouts with various issuers decrease the concern of
a bondholder holdout, see Royce de R. Barondes, An Economic Analysis of the Potential for
Coercion in Consent Solicitations for Bonds, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 749 (1994)
(demonstrating that, under proper assumptions, issuers are unable to create a Prisoner’s
Dilemma for bondholder consent solicitations).
159. In Israel, the moratorium is ordered by the court pursuant to section 350(b) of the
Companies Act. In the U.S., once a bankruptcy petition has been filed the stay applies
automatically under section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.
160. See, e.g., BANKRUPTCY CODE, 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2006) (providing that if the trustee
is unable to obtain unsecured credit, the court may authorize the obtaining of credit or the
incurring of debt with priority over any or all administrative expenses of the kind specified
in other sections of this title).
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and non-institutional alike), the government agencies who regulate the
capital market and the Ministry of Finance in its capacity as the treasurer of
the taxpayers’ money, should realize that there are legal tools designed
specifically for resolving the financial distress of debtor firms and
facilitating the payment to their creditors, without losing the viability of the
firms. Those tools are found in bankruptcy law. Once Israel’s law has
adopted a reorganization regime, bankruptcy should no longer be treated as
a terminal disease that ought to be avoided as long as possible. Quite the
contrary is true. Reorganization law was enacted explicitly as a mechanism
for rescuing distressed firms and protecting their going-concern value for
the benefit of their creditors. A firm who is experiencing a payment crisis
can stabilize itself and reach a workable solution with its creditors through
the reorganization proceedings. These proceedings often only simplify
otherwise complex matters and procedures.161
The potential of
reorganization proceedings is especially powerful when coupled with a
prenegotiated or prepackaged reorganization plan. The creditors and the
firm together can enter quiet and relatively peaceful negotiations pertaining
to the modified terms of payment, the design and structure of the firm’s
future capital and its prospective business plan. During these negotiations
the debtor continues to run its business, uninterrupted, in its ordinary
course.162 Once the negotiations are ripe for finalization, the firm can enter
bankruptcy and enjoy the automatic stay, new opportunities for financing
and the advanced and flexible mechanism of approving the reorganization
plan by classes of creditors.163 Thus, instead of avoiding bankruptcy law,
all actors should embrace it as an available and useful, albeit by no means
the sole, vehicle for rescuing firms. For that to happen, the most notable
change that is required has to do with perception. The traditional
bankruptcy phobia must make way to a modern constructive and unbiased
understanding that bankruptcy law is not the terminal move in the game all
should avoid as long as possible.164 Bankruptcy should not be a measure of
161. For a similar argument concerning the positive role of Chapter 11 for U.S.
businesses, see Lubben, supra note 125 (countering criticisms of the inadequacy of Chapter
11 for major institutions in financial distress).
162. Courtney C. Carter, Note, Saving Face in Southeast Asia: The Implementation of
Prepackaged Plans of Reorganization in Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, 17 BANK. DEV.
J. 295 (2000).
163. However, sometimes a quick bankruptcy case is no more than a reflection of poor
bankruptcy practice. For such an argument concerning the case of Chrysler’s swift
bankruptcy case, see Mark J. Roe & David A. Skeel, Jr., Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy
(Aug. 2009), U. Penn. Inst. L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 09-22, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1426530 (“[T]he Chrysler bankruptcy cannot be understood as
complying with good bankruptcy practice. . . .”).
164. On the adverse perception of business bankruptcy in the business community, see
Robert I. Sutton & Anita L. Callahan, The Stigma of Bankruptcy: Spoiled Organizational
Image and Its Management, 30 AC. MAN. J. 405 (1987) (proposing that Chapter 11
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last resort used only after all the (so-called) conventional attempts to solve
a firm’s financial distress have been exhausted. Bankruptcy law is a
judicially prescribed treatment of financial distress. A reorganization case
should be regarded as an opportunity, not as a black hole. While at the
early stage of the case there exists uncertainty regarding the ultimate form
of relief for the firm and the treatment of the creditors’ claims, the same is
true with respect to any negotiations oriented alternative. The ultimate
outcome is unknown to the parties beforehand. Any out of court
arrangement is similarly vulnerable to break down.165
B. The Need for Modern Reorganization Law
In the past, regional economic crises have led to the reform of
national insolvency laws and the legislation of reorganization schemes.
Such legislation was intended to set a framework for salvaging domestic
businesses. Indeed, crises are traditionally catalysts for improvement and
reform. The recent bonds crisis in Israel can, and in my eyes should, be a
catalyst for revising its reorganization law. Revising the law and fine
tuning it may contribute to a rational business environment that would be
willing to use reorganization law wisely and efficiently. To the extent that
the revised law will appeal to the parties and present a flexible platform for
relieving a cash constrained debtor from the burden of due and payable
claims, it is expected to assume its rightful place at the fore of the business
legislation and complement its counter parts, namely contracts law,
corporate law, securities regulation, and the law of secured transactions.
Such a revision would benefit the business world and fill a substantial hole
that currently impedes the proper functioning of business entities, their
investors and financers.
To make reorganization law appealing and a useful tool, the following
revisions should be legislated:
(a) adopting a DIP regime for debtor firms, the control of whom
is dispersed;
(b) carving the absolute priority of the floating charge;
(c) facilitating the continuance of executory contracts in general,
and license and franchises in particular, during reorganization;
and
(d) adopting the cramdown mechanism.

discredits a firm and its managers, causing a series of negative responses that lead to
significant organizational trouble).
165. This vulnerability is exacerbated outside of bankruptcy by the lack of a moratorium.
Thus, any solo action by a creditor to levy on the firm’s property and collect
notwithstanding the negotiated workout may turn to be the brick drawn out of the
(eventually) collapsing wall.
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As explained above in Part IV.B, the current statutory law is deficient
in that it has thus far failed to provide the debtor and its creditors with
sufficient incentives to use reorganization and to address their mutual
conflicts of interest through mitigating tools. The revisions I propose
herein are intended to fill this legislative gap.
1. Adopting a DIP Regime
Any debtor enjoys information superiority over its creditors regarding
the debtor’s financial state. As a result, the debtor is the classic initiator of
reorganization actions.166 Given the appropriate incentives, a debtor would
use its informational advantage to take action for saving its business as
early as necessary. In the corporate context it is thus essential to entice the
primary decision makers of the debtor, namely its managers and directors,
to timely resort to formal reorganization and take advantage of its
constructive facets.167 A DIP regime is precisely the measure necessary to
neutralize the decision makers’ aversion to reorganization proceedings.
From their perspective, it is control of the firm more than any other factor
that drives them away from official proceedings. A proceeding that leaves
them at the helm is the antidote for their aversion. Adopting a DIP regime
is the most significant legal reform aimed at transforming reorganization
from law in the books into law in action.
Given the practical dependency of managers and directors of a firm on
the controlling shareholder of that firm, however, a DIP regime would
effectively entrench the controlling shareholder at a time when the best
interests of the creditors should prevail in the firm’s decision making.168
Outside formal bankruptcy, in the regular business environment, financial
creditors are equipped with sophisticated contractual covenants to combat
any externalization of risks created by the controlling shareholder. In
166. This argument is strongly supported by empirical research. See STUART C. GILSON,
CREATING VALUE THROUGH CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING: CASE STUDIES IN BANKRUPTCIES,
BUYOUTS, AND BREAKUPS Chapter 1 (2001) (presenting corporate restructuring primarily as
a challenge of corporate management). See also Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R.
Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11 30 tbl.3 (Columbia Univ. Ctr. for
Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 321 and Northwestern Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ.
Research
Paper
Series,
Paper
No.
08-16,
2008),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081661 (presenting information about corporate bankruptcy cases
filed in 2001); Ethan S. Bernstein, All’s Fair in Love, War & Bankruptcy? Corporate
Governance Implications of CEO Turnover in Financial Distress, 11 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN.
298, 299 n.3 (2006) (noting the rarity of involuntary bankruptcies in the United States).
167. See Susan Block-Lieb, Why Creditors File So Few Involuntary Petitions and Why
the Number is Not Too Small, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 803, 804-05 (1991) (discussing the tactical
advantages conferred upon debtors that voluntarily file for bankruptcy).
168. David Hahn, Concentrated Ownership and Control of Corporate Reorganisations,
4 J. CORP. L. STUD. 117, 131 (2004).
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bankruptcy, however, the contractual enforcement rights of creditors are
suspended due to the legal moratorium. Thus, paradoxically, absent tight
control by the presiding court, a controlling shareholder may enjoy a more
lax business environment inside bankruptcy than outside, jeopardizing the
creditors’ money within the formal framework. Therefore, converting
reorganization law from a trustee-controlled regime to a DIP-controlled
regime should be done cautiously and conservatively. I believe that a shift
to a DIP regime should be applied at first only with respect to publicly
traded firms whose stock is diffuse, with no shareholder holding a
controlling position. In such firms, the only decision makers that matter
are the managers and directors. Once the decision makers are encouraged
to file for bankruptcy, they are also likely to read the map correctly and
adopt the creditors’ agenda as their own.169 In these cases, the shadow of
the shareholders is hardly threatening to management. Diffuse stock
ownership is typical in large firms, whose financial distress severely affects
many other actors and the economy at large. Thus, encouraging these firms
to timely file for bankruptcy is expected to be a positive legislative
contribution to the successful handling of financial distress.
Another statutory provision that may simplify the reorganization
initiation problem described above would be an amendment that would
explicitly entitle creditors holding unliquidated or unmatured claims to file
for reorganization.170 Should such an amendment be enacted, an indenture
trustee, on behalf of the bondholders, would be entitled to file for
reorganization of the distressed issuing firm once it has defaulted on any of
its financial covenants, even if the debenture lacks an acceleration clause.
The mere deterioration in the debtor’s financial stability, and the
heightened risk of default and insolvency as a result thereof, shall suffice
for collective actions initiated by the creditors. The fact that the specific
payment to the petitioning creditor is not yet due will not weaken that
creditor’s entitlement to take action aimed at saving the debtor’s goingconcern value and preventing stalling tactics by the firm’s management and
board of directors.171 This amendment shall overcome the problem
encountered by holders of covenant-light bonds.172
169. Id.
170. Cf. BANKRUPTCY CODE, 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2006) (defining the term “claim”),
303(b)(1) (2006) (describing commencement of an involuntary case by holders of claims).
171. Alternatively, the legislature or regulator may demand the inclusion of an
acceleration clause in any corporate bonds issuing as a mandatory prerequisite for public
offering of the bonds. Such a potential initiative is currently discussed by the regulators.
See MINISTRY OF FINANCE, THE COMMITTEE FOR ESTABLISHING PARAMETERS FOR
INSTITUTIONAL BODIES’ INVESTMENTS IN NONGOVERNMENTAL BONDS—INTERIM REPORT FOR
PUBLIC
COMMENTS
(Sept.
2009),
available
at
http://www.finance.gov.il/hon/2001/hon_dep/memos/chodek-e.pdf.
172. However, the amendment does not overcome creditors’ hesitation to initiate a
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Simplifying the conditions for a creditors’ initiation of bankruptcy
cannot serve as a proxy for a DIP regime, however. As explained above,
given its information superiority, the debtor is the ultimate initiator of
reorganization proceedings. Additionally, even if initiated by creditors in a
timely manner, trustee-controlled bankruptcy suffers from inefficiencies
due to the vulnerability of the newly appointed trustee and the
confrontational atmosphere in which the trustee functions.173 Therefore, an
optimal legal regime would provide the firm’s decision makers with the
proper incentives to file for reorganization, rather than turning the legal
attention to creditors’ initiated proceedings. Thus, adopting a DIP regime
for diffused (shareholder) control firms is the preferable legal reform.
2. Carve-Out of Floating Charges
It has been mentioned above that pre-bankruptcy secured creditors,
holding an encompassing floating charge on all the debtor firm’s assets,
enjoy an effective financing monopoly.174 No other creditor would
voluntarily finance the firm, as it is automatically junior to the holder of the
floating charge. This leads to various inefficiencies, including overlending
by the holder of the floating charge,175 suboptimal monitoring by the fully
secured creditor,176 and externalization of risks to the other creditors.177 In
the context of negotiating a reorganization of capital arrangement with a
firm’s bondholders, this absolute priority of the floating charge over the
entire firm’s property, including property acquired during the
reorganization case, frustrates the ability of the debtor firm to offer the
bondholders delayed installment payments secured by a prime security
interest in uncollateralized property. To overcome this problem, the
legislature should amend the statute to provide that property acquired
during the reorganization case is free of any pre-bankruptcy security
collective bankruptcy case, given the adverse effect of free riding by the other creditors. See
Douglas G. Baird, The Initiation Problem in Bankruptcy, 11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 223,
223-24 (1991) (discussing the collective action problem that hinders creditors’ initiation of
bankruptcy proceedings).
173. Hahn, supra note 168, at 124-27.
174. See David Hahn, When Bankruptcy Meets Antitrust: The Case for Non-cash
Auctions in Concentrated Banking Markets, 11 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 28, 30 (2005)
(explaining that in concentrated banking markets, banks’ domination of the supply side of
financing creates the potential for a squeeze-out of the debtor’s junior creditors in
bankruptcy proceedings).
175. David de Meza, Overlending?, 112 ECON. J. F17, F22 (2002).
176. John Hudson, The Case Against Secured Lending, 15 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 47, 54
(1995); Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051,
1057-59 (1984).
177. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 881-82 (1996).

HAHNFINAL

2010]

6/10/2010 10:52:42 AM

REORGANIZATION PROCEEDINGS IN EMERGING MARKETS

775

interests178 or alternatively, to carve out a certain percentage from the
firm’s property that is subject to the floating charge in favor of other
creditors. The latter idea was proposed some years ago in the U.S. by
Bebchuk and Fried.179 Either alternative would facilitate the use of the
firm’s property in advancing a bondholders’ arrangement.
3. Saving Executory Contracts
As stated earlier, in Israel the fate of executory contracts upon the
filing for reorganization is extremely fragile. Any ipso facto clause may
terminate the contract. Also, case law is unclear on the issue of whether a
pre-commencement payment default entitles the non-debtor party to
rescind the contract. Such contracts may be a license obtained and used by
the debtor firm, or a real estate lease in a primary and strategic location.
Under current law, the filing for reorganization does not immunize these
contracts from rescission, and may even be the official contractual trigger
for their termination.180 The triggering events of ipso facto clauses cast
dark shadows over any formal reorganization initiative.181 Wishing to
preserve the business’ substantial assets, distressed firms that are lessees or
licensees attempt to avoid formal bankruptcy as long as possible and
resolve their financial problems outside the courtroom. However, given the
various obstacles presented outside of formal bankruptcy, namely the lack
of moratorium and the consent required from all creditors for any debt
restructuring, it may be wise to reverse the legal factors that influence the
actions of the parties. By enacting into law the invalidity of ipso facto
clauses and facilitating the continuation of previously breached executory
contracts, formal reorganization would become a hospitable arena for
salvaging financially ailing firms. Executory contracts would continue to
run and generate the firm’s core business, while the parties enjoy the
advantageous rules of reorganization law that facilitate their reaching a
consensual reorganization plan. Saving executory contracts would remove

178. Cf. BANKRUPTCY CODE, 11 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006) (“[P]roperty acquired by the
estate or by the debtor after the commencement of the case is not subject to any lien
resulting from any security agreement entered into by the debtor before the commencement
of the case.”). Should such a provision be enacted in Israel, it ought to be conditioned upon
the safeguard of adequate protection for the rights of the holder of the floating charge in its
secured claim.
179. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 177, at 909-11 (discussing the “fixed-fraction
priority rule,” in which a fixed fraction of the secured creditor’s secured claim would
continue to be treated as a secured claim, while the remainder would be treated as an
unsecured claim).
180. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text (discussing legislation and case law
relating to executory contracts).
181. Triantis, supra note 103.
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a major tactical component of the decision-makers’ aversion to bankruptcy.
The veracity of this argument has been proven empirically.182 Israel should
follow this path if it wishes to perfect its reorganization law.
4. Cramdown
The final revision that may enhance the efficacy of formal
reorganization would be the enactment of a cramdown provision. That is,
the reorganization statute should provide for the confirmation of a
reorganization plan over the dissent of one or more of the voting classes of
creditors or equity holders.183 Given the conflicts of interest among classes
in general, and among various series of bonds in particular, the dissent of a
certain voting class is a very likely possibility. Enacting a cramdown
provision would facilitate reorganization, as it would neutralize the ability
of any single class to hold out and veto the plan. This removes one of the
major impediments to salvaging the firm and arranging a payment plan for
its creditors. Moreover, by allowing the confirmation of a plan over the
dissent of a class, the legislature would effectively encourage the various
classes to display more flexibility at the bargaining table and reach a
consensual arrangement, in order to avoid the deep involvement on the part
of the court that would be required in the case of cramdown.184 Thus, the
legislation of a cramdown provision may eventually prove itself as a
catalyst for out-of-court workouts.

VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S.
There is much debate over the appropriate method for addressing
widespread financial crises around the globe, both in emerging markets as
well as developed and sophisticated ones. The financial crisis of 2009 has
compelled the U.S. government to devise a policy and select an approach
for dealing with the crippled financial sector. Realizing the severe
ramifications of non-intervention, the government chose to open its
treasury and provide financial institutions on the brink of insolvency with
unprecedented amounts of cash. This policy effectively follows the idea of
firms that are simply “too big to fail.”185 The public sector refuses to let go
182. Simeon Djankov, Oliver Hart, Caralee McLiesh & Andrei Shleifer, Debt
Enforcement around the World, 116 J. POL. ECON. 1105 (2008).
183. The U.S. cramdown provision is located in BANKRUPTCY CODE, 11 U.S.C. §
1129(b) (2006).
184. See Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation
Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain, 115 YALE L.J. 1930, 1952-63 (2006)
(discussing the bargaining process that takes place during corporate reorganizations).
185. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (discussing the concept “too big to
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and allow the private sector, as troubled as its state may be, to
independently sort out its predicament. The government was not willing to
allow the investors in the financial markets to bear all the losses from the
mismanagement of their investments. The billions of dollars lost in the
crisis, the snowball effect on the entire economy and the loss of trust in the
market system–one of the foundations of the U.S. economy–outweighed all
counter-considerations and drove the government to carry the load and bail
out the failing firms.
At first, this intervention policy of the U.S. government was praised
by commentators. However, after a while, many began voicing counterarguments doubting the wisdom of this policy.186 Whether any firm or
sector is indeed “too big to fail,” and thus justifies a subsidy from the
taxpayers, is the subject of heated debate and will not be resolved any time
soon.187 Most notably, Ken Ayotte and David Skeel have highlighted the
costs and adverse effects of a government bailout.188 In their article, Ayotte
and Skeel argue that the moral hazard exacerbated by the bailout is likely to
taint future transactions in the market and encourage managers to
overinvest.189 Thus, the disciplinary power of the market may be lost
precisely because of the bailout.190
The lesson to be learned from Israel’s struggle with the fall of its
bonds market in 2009 may support Ayotte and Skeel’s proposition.
Despite the initial national concern for a widespread loss of the public’s
long-term pension savings, the Israeli Government eventually chose not to
intervene, and instead opted to withhold its reserves, forcing all the relevant
market players to resolve their financial crises on their own.191 The events
fail”).
186. For example, Joseph Stiglitz advocates government financing of troubled firms in
exchange for preferred stock of those firms. Joseph E. Stiglitz, We Aren’t Done Yet:
Comments on the Financial Crises and Bailout, 5 THE ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, Issue 5, Article
11 (2008).
187. For criticism of the treasury’s generous use of taxpayers’ money, see Aaron S.
Edlin, Questioning the Treasury’s $700 Billion Blank Check: An Open Letter to Secretary
Paulson, 5 THE ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, Issue 5, Article 4 (2008).
188. Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 131.
189. Id. at 20-21. See also Manfredo A. Dix, Letter, The Dangers of Forgetting Moral
Hazard, 5 THE ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, Issue 5, Article 15 (2008) (discussing the moral hazard
of bailing out the subprime mortgage borrowers).
190. See David O. Beim, Good Bailouts and Bad, 5 THE ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, Issue 5,
Article 8 (2008) (arguing that bad bailouts only worsen the functioning of the market); Luigi
Zingales, Yes We Can, Secretary Geithner, 6 THE ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, Issue 2, Article 3
(2009) (discussing that the market reaction to the Troubled Asset Relief Program revealed
that government intervention essentially transferred wealth from taxpayers to financial
investors).
191. Adrian Filut, Minister of Finance, Steinitz: We Shall Not Intervene in Cases of
Aug.
31,
2009,
available
at
Bonds
Defaults,
GLOBES,
http://www.globes.co.il/news/articleaspx?did=1000494123&fid=585 (Hebrew) (discussing
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that have transpired since illustrate that once all actors realize that there is
no realistic chance to extract subsidies from the government for paying the
private sector’s debts, negotiations will progress more effectively and the
parties will somehow configure a solution to best suit their situation.192
These solutions are far from ideal. Indeed, in many cases, the dealings are
with an insolvent debtor and the eventual return to the creditors is far from
being whole. Nonetheless, through these private solutions, the parties
prove that even large financial losses may be borne by the private sector
without necessarily crippling the entire economy. While the market suffers
a temporary fall, its overall integrity may be preserved. Future investments
will be made with greater caution and will be coupled with insistence on
enhanced transparency and improved monitoring of managers’ investment
decisions.
The previous parts of this paper showed that the solutions devised in
the Israeli market were reached under sub-optimal conditions. Avoiding
the use of formal bankruptcy proceedings may impair the debtor’s value
and hamper the parties’ bargaining positions. The primary reasons for this
avoidance, namely the divestment of management and controlling
shareholders of their control, the vagueness of the statutory law and the
negative connotation of formal reorganization proceedings, are less
prevalent in the U.S. The Bankruptcy Code is far more developed and
sophisticated than Israel’s insolvency law, is debtor-friendly and is more
acceptable as a means for resolving corporate financial distress. These
factors make the U.S. a more workable and accommodating arena for
resolving the financial crisis than its counterparts around the globe. Thus,
the lesson from Israel’s recent experience, which proves that government
abstention from aiding failing firms does not necessarily cripple the market
but rather drives its actors to act on their own, may suggest that the nonintervention policy is even more promising for the U.S. The advantages of
U.S. bankruptcy law should be utilized for resolving financial distress of
market giants. The alternative bailout is simply too costly, both in the
present (the use of taxpayers’ money) and in the future (moral hazard).193

the government’s refusal to intervene in assisting Africa-Israel Investments and other
corporations in paying its debts).
192. The actual consensual workouts in the two largest financial crises in Israel, those of
the real estate giant Africa-Israel and of the shipping corporation Zim, are direct results of
the government’s announced policy.
193. Yet, realistically, this suggestion may be qualified. To the extent that a crisis hits
the financial sector across the board, the severe danger of a colossal meltdown of the entire
financial system may at times outweigh the costs of subsidizing the market with taxpayers’
money and moral hazard and justify certain governmental intervention. Cordella & Yeyati,
supra note 149.
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CONCLUSION
The global economic crisis of 2008-2009 has affected many emerging
markets and slowed down their business activity. Israel is no exception.
Many firms have recently faced financial distress and were struggling to
keep their payment obligations and avoid default. The novel aspect of the
crisis is the wide exposure of holders of listed and traded bonds to default.
Investors in the young Israeli bonds market treated these investments as
solid and safe ones, only to discover during the crisis that they were subject
to substantial losses resulting from the looming insolvency of the issuing
firms. A large percentage of the bonds is held by institutional investors,
which manage the long-term savings of the public. This has created public
interest in the search for satisfactory solutions to the bonds crisis.
Several government bailout proposals have been considered.
However, the eventual official announcement of the Minister of Finance
that the government will not bail out even the largest firms from the private
sector has put these initiatives to rest.194 Thus, the parties were necessarily
drawn back to the negotiations table.
Nonetheless, and perhaps
surprisingly, the path of formal reorganization proceedings under
bankruptcy law has been largely overlooked, if not deliberately and
consciously avoided. Dodging reorganization may be explained as the
result of several cumulative factors. One major factor contributing to this
situation is a general misconception of the constructive role reorganization
law plays in salvaging ailing businesses. This misconception may be
remedied only through a consistent and gradual cultural change towards
understanding insolvency and what its law represents. Another major
factor is the poor state of Israeli reorganization law. Several aspects of
current reorganization law deter the decision makers in a firm, as well as
their creditors, from utilizing this channel.
This paper calls for using the crisis as a catalyst for reforming Israel’s
reorganization law, strengthening its weak aspects and transforming it into
an attractive, practical and workable channel for the satisfactory resolution
of creditors’ rights and the rescue of viable businesses.

194. See Filut, supra note 191 (reporting the Minister of Finance’s statement that the
government has decided to refuse bailing out financially distressed corporations).

